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THE USE AND MISUSE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW
JONATHAN R. POVILONIS
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a crucial corrective to the “corporate
social responsibility” debate, which concerns whether corporations
have the obligation to protect or serve the interests of groups other
than their shareholders, like employees or customers (often called
“stakeholders”). Scholars on one side of the debate have repeatedly
presumed that corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders
play an important role in protecting shareholders from decisions
that favor stakeholders at their expense. Scholars on the other side
agree that fiduciary duties provide meaningful protection against
unfavorable conduct but argue that directors should also owe fiduciary duties to stakeholders so they may be similarly protected.
This Article argues that this shared premise is mistaken: Fiduciary duties in practice play almost no role in director decisions to
favor one corporate group over another. The Article first explains
that courts and scholars rarely note the difference between two distinct definitions of the duty of loyalty—one broad and one narrow—
and argues that only the broader definition would allow this duty
to have any impact on directors’ distribution of corporate resources.
Under this narrow definition, fiduciary duties to shareholders prevent directors from acting in their own self-interest, but not from
acting in the interests of stakeholders at shareholders’ expense. The
Article then argues that Delaware law enforces only the narrow definition of loyalty due to its default judicial standard of review, the
business judgment rule, which largely eliminates shareholders’
ability to protect themselves from directors’ decisions that favor other
Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP; JD, magna cum laude,
NYU School of Law. The views expressed in this Article are my own and do
not reflect the views of my firm. I am grateful to Richard A. Epstein, Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, and Robert T. Miller for helpful feedback on multiple versions
of this Article. All errors are my own.
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stakeholders. Finally, given this is true for shareholders, the Article argues it would likewise be true for employees (or any other
stakeholders), were they to be owed fiduciary duties by directors.
Because fiduciary duties do not protect against such unfavorable
conduct, the Article concludes it is a mistake to debate to whom
directors should owe fiduciary duties. Advocates for shareholder
or stakeholder protection should therefore focus on other mechanisms to obtain it.
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INTRODUCTION

If you thought corporate law was broken, how would you
fix it? Maybe you hold the increasingly popular view that the law
makes corporate executives too beholden to shareholder interests,
and that this is ruining things for everyone else.1 Or maybe you
think, along similar lines, that employees are getting a particularly lousy deal, so the law should take additional steps to single
them out for protection.2 Or maybe you think it’s really the local
community or society at large that needs extra protection, given
that the relentless pursuit of shareholder profits has the potential
to impose massive externalities on those outside the firm.3 Scholars
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course:
The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 389 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he logical result of Citizens
United, when combined with the conservative corporate theory view that corporations should only spend money on increasing stockholders’ wealth, is that
corporations will pour money into the electoral process to increase the returns to their stockholders. Because corporate wealth far exceeds that held
directly by human beings, if corporations are able to act directly to influence
who is elected to office, the laws and regulations in our society will increasingly tend to tolerate the imposition of greater externalities.”); see also BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (July 2021),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRTStatementonthePurposeofaCorporation
July2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/98SR-VTCT].
2 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105
GEO. L.J. 819, 819 (2017) (“[T]his Article argues that employers are fiduciaries and must refrain from opportunism, especially when employees have no
voice in governance.”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1991) (developing a “model [that] expands
directorial fiduciary duties to encompass actions that shield workers from disruptions brought about by plant closings and other corporate changes. Such
fiduciary duties toward workers would require directors to provide adequate
severance payments, job retraining, and other appropriate relief to displaced
workers.”); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics
Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 (2008)
(arguing “for employee primacy in corporate governance. ‘Employee primacy’
has two elements: ultimate employee control over the corporation, and an
objective of maximizing employee welfare”).
3 Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J.
947, 949 (2008). Greenfield argues that “[c]hanges in corporate law could make it
possible to take advantage of the distinctive abilities of the corporation to create
1
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often refer to these nonshareholder groups as “stakeholders,” so
this Article will do the same.4 Concerns on behalf of stakeholders
are typically focused on distribution—the issue is not that a corporation creates wealth, but that its wealth is not distributed among
the various constituencies appropriately.5 Because shareholders are
the only constituency (other than the corporation itself) to whom
corporate directors owe fiduciary duties,6 one proposed solution has
emerged time and again: modify the law so that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to stakeholders as well.7 Could a “multifiduciary” or “multi-stakeholder” approach to corporate governance
fix these distribution problems in corporate law?
Of course, many would dispute the premise that corporate
law is broken.8 They would say it is working perfectly fine, thank
you, and not just for the executives and the shareholders, but also
for other stakeholders, whether they be employees, customers, or
society at large.9 Proponents of this view have also laid claim to

wealth, while making it less likely that corporations will do so through breaches of
the public trust or the imposition of costly externalities on stakeholders or
communities.” Id. He argues that “directors should be held to a fiduciary obligation to all of the firm’s stakeholders that varies according to the nature of the
stakeholders’ contributions to the success of the firm.” Id. at 975–76.
4 See id. at 949.
5 See id. at 975.
6 See, e.g., N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 99 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”). Scholars generally agree
with this purely descriptive account at a high level. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 586 (1992) (“There is probably no more frequently
articulated principle of corporate law than that directors are fiduciaries of the
corporation and its stockholders.”). But, as explained below, that is about as far
as the agreement goes. See infra notes 8–17 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 3, at 961.
8 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Elizabeth Warren’s Corporate Illogic, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warrens-corporate-il
logic-1536705547 [https://perma.cc/A3WZ-Y8TA]; see also Council of Inst. Invs.,
Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on
Corporate Purpose (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response [https://
perma.cc/3LY6-5RPU].
9 See, e.g., id. (stating that “American corporate law provides that boards
of directors are chosen solely by shareholders, to whom the directors owe an exclusive fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value. That simple proposition
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the directors’ fiduciary duties, not out of concern for employees or
customers (who, they contend, will get by just fine with regulatory
and contractual protections),10 but instead, as a means to secure
what is considered the only proper end of corporate governance:
shareholder wealth maximization.11 Sometimes called “shareholder
primacy,”12 this view holds that the only proper goal of every corporate action is to increase shareholder wealth (within the bounds
of the law),13 and that the proper way to understand directors’ fiduciary duty is simply as the duty to choose actions that best
achieve that goal.14 Much of this is also concerned about distribution: Corporate directors ought not to distribute corporate resources to stakeholders, they contend, except as a means to create
further shareholder wealth.15 And an important purpose of directors’ fiduciary duties, according to this view, is to prevent directors from improperly benefiting nonshareholder groups.16 This,
in brief, is the debate about “corporate social responsibility” and
the role that fiduciary duties might play in it.17
If all this rings with too much abstraction, let’s get concrete.
Imagine General Motors has a particularly successful year and
closes its books with a 100% cash surplus, meaning its cash reserves
are double the amount that GM’s management deems necessary

has generated benefits not only for shareholders but also for workers, suppliers,
customers, bondholders and communities”).
10 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1434
(1993) [hereinafter In Defense of the Shareholder].
11 See id. at 1423.
12 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 106 (2020) (describing the
“shareholder primacy view” as the view that “directors should focus on the welfare of shareholders”).
13 See id. at 106.
14 See id.
15 See Greenfield, supra note 3, at 952; see also Kelli A. Alces, Debunking
the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 240 (2009) (see discussion
regarding corporate directors’ interest in maximizing profits to the corporation’s entirety).
16 See infra Section IV.A.
17 See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:
Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197,
1198–99 (2011) [hereinafter The Public Choice Problem].
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to cover its ongoing operating expenses and capital expenditures.
Say it has a surplus of ten billion dollars. Are the company’s directors18 obligated to distribute the surplus to the shareholders, say, in
the form of a dividend or stock buyback program? May the directors give some or all of the surplus to the company’s employees
in the form of annual bonuses or salary raises? Or do the directors also have an obligation to GM’s customers, such that they
ought to use some of the ten billion to offer lower vehicle prices or
more favorable warranty packages? And what about the environment, which the company’s products and production chains have
possibly harmed along the way or the communities that have devoted their resources to supporting the company—do GM’s directors
have the obligation (or, at least, the freedom) to spend any of that
ten billion on them?
This Article does not attempt to mediate this debate, at least
not directly. Instead, it focuses on an unlikely agreement among
the various ideological positions that fiduciary duties play an important role in the debate.19 To make this clear, consider the vast
array of proposals and arguments involving corporate fiduciary
duties that scholars, courts, and legislators have offered. There
have been calls for eliminating directors’ fiduciary duties altogether,
both on the justification that they are too restrictive20 and that they
provide no meaningful restrictions whatsoever.21 Some scholars
have argued that fiduciary duties are so important that statutes
permitting parties to waive them, even in so-called unincorporated forms like the LLC, are bad policy22 and even constitutionally
For ease of reference, this Article uses the terms “directors” or the
“board” to refer to any corporate directors, officers, or managers who owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders. See also Mitchell,
supra note 6, at 586.
19 See infra Section I.B.
20 Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2008) (“Imposing duties on directors that are too rigid or
too mechanical may limit the ability of investors to create capital structures
that are beyond the ken of those writing the rules .... [I]t may make sense to
eliminate the concept of fiduciary duty in corporate law altogether.”).
21 Alces, supra note 15, at 240 (arguing that the doctrine of corporate fiduciary duties “is little more than a fiction”).
22 See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned Principles and Failed Fiduciary Standards in Uniform Partnership and
18
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prohibited.23 Other scholars (and some courts) continue to maintain that corporate directors should owe fiduciary duties to shareholders alone,24 to both shareholders and employees,25 to employees
and customers,26 to the corporation as a whole (with no special
treatment for shareholders),27 to bondholders,28 and to creditors
of insolvent or “near-insolvent” firms.29 In addition, the language
of fiduciary duty has also been used to describe corporate directors’ relationships to the environment,30 to stakeholder groups

LLC Statutes, 96 KY. L.J. 163, 168 (2007); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of
“Alternative Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 465 (2009).
23 See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV.
701, 702 (2011) (arguing “that the Delaware General Assembly is constitutionally
prohibited from preventing the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery from
applying fiduciary duties as those judges think best—whether or not a private
agreement purports to eliminate such duties. Judges themselves, therefore, should
not refrain from applying traditional fiduciary duties as they have always
done—i.e., as a particular context may equitably require”) (citations omitted).
24 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 44 (1991).
25 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1194.
26 See, e.g., The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236.
27 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team
Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743,
743 (1999).
28 See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L.
205, 206 (1988).
29 See, e.g., Cory Dean Kandestin, The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent
Firms: Eliminating the Near-Insolvency Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1238
(2007); see also N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92, 101–03 (Del. 2007) (holding “that individual creditors of an insolvent
corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty
against corporate directors. Creditors may nonetheless protect their interest by
bringing derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation or any other
direct nonfiduciary claim ... that may be available for individual creditors”).
30 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 708 (2002) (“The concept
of corporate accountability asks what duties might exist for corporations to
account to society for the implications of their actions; that is, what duties might
require corporations to inform society about the social, political, economic,



2021] THE USE AND MISUSE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

9

effected by international human rights issues,31 to local communities,32 and to the public in general.33
An implicit premise in each of these arguments is that it
is extremely important to whom directors owe fiduciary duties,
because being owed such duties would entitle that person or group
to sue the directors to prevent corporate actions that improperly
favor other corporate groups at their expense.34 Because of this,
scholars on all sides of the debate implicitly agree that when it
comes to directors’ decisions about the distribution of corporate
resources, the fact that directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, rather than to other stakeholders like employees or customers,
really matters.35 This Article’s argument is simple: it does not.36
The reasons for this are a bit more complicated.37 As explained below, if a shareholder sues to challenge a board decision
on the grounds that it unduly benefits other stakeholders, under
current law the reviewing court is obligated to “defer to the board
of directors’ judgment absent highly unusual exceptions,”38 and thus
the decision will be overturned only in rare circumstances.39 This

and environmental consequences of managers’ and directors’ exercise of their
fiduciary responsibilities.”).
31 See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005) (arguing
that “boards’ current fiduciary duties to their shareholders require them to consider
the rights and interests of stakeholder groups, including those rights and interests
exemplified in the international law of human rights”); Amy Lehr, Fiduciary Duties for a Globalized World: Stakeholder Theory Reconceived, 27 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 81, 103, 131 (2019).
32 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholder: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 421 (1993) (considering a “set of fiduciary duties to the local community” and rejecting this proposal for other reasons).
33 See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 125–26 (Oxford Univ. Press
ed., 2011) (discussing “[t]he common law doctrine of public trust [that] imposes on governing bodies fiduciary duties toward the public” and the possibility
of applying this obligation on the management of a corporation).
34 See infra Part IV; O’Connor, supra note 2, at 955, 958–59.
35 See infra Part III; FRANKEL, supra note 33, at 124–25.
36 See infra Section I.B.
37 See infra Section I.B.
38 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87–88 (2019) [hereinafter Business Judgment Rule].
39 See id.
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doctrine, known as the “business judgment rule,” is the standard
of review that courts apply when evaluating claims for the violation of fiduciary duties to shareholders.40 The rule obliges judges
to abstain from evaluating almost all board decisions, whether
or not they were motivated by concern for other stakeholders.41
Generally speaking, the standard of review refers to the
amount of deference a reviewer affords to an earlier decisionmaker.42 In the federal appellate context, for example, the standard
of review determines the question an appellate court asks when
reviewing a district court’s decision: questions of law are reviewed
de novo,43 questions of fact are reviewed for clear error,44 and
matters of discretion are reviewed for abuse of discretion.45 The
court’s determination of the correct standard of review is important, as it can determine the entire outcome of the case.46 If the
standard of review is sufficiently deferential, the appellate court
may be required to affirm the decision of the district court even
if it would have reached a different conclusion on its own independent judgment.47
In shareholder lawsuits alleging the violation of Delaware48
directors’ fiduciary duties, the initial decision-maker is typically
the board of directors, and the reviewer is typically the Delaware

See id. at 90–91 and accompanying notes.
Id. at 87 (arguing “that the [business judgment] rule is better understood
as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied”).
42 See Maureen B. Collins, Incorporating the Standard of Review Into Your
Appellate Argument, 90 ILL. B.J. 209, 209 (2002).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (“The upshot in terms
of judicial review is some practical difference in outcome depending upon which
standard is used.”).
46 See, e.g., id. at 162.
47 See, e.g., Krull v. SEC, 248 F.3d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
deferential standard of review “constrains us, even if we might decide otherwise
were it left to our independent judgment”).
48 For the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses on corporate law in Delaware, the most important state for corporate law. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers
of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763 (2015) [hereinafter Dangers of Denial] (calling
Delaware “the most important American jurisdiction” for corporate law).
40
41
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Court of Chancery.49 Now, it is well known that in Delaware corporate law there is often an enormous gap between the standard
of conduct—the rule directors must follow—and the Court’s standard of review—the question the Court is required to ask when a
plaintiff alleges a fiduciary violation.50 Further, this gap, created
by the business judgment rule, is seen by scholars and courts as
fundamental to corporate law, as it secures the appropriate balance
between directors’ authority to manage the corporation and their
accountability to judges and shareholders.51 Any decision to modify
the rule, then, should not be made lightly.52
Nonetheless, the corporate social responsibility debate’s
focus on fiduciary duties has largely failed to consider how this
standard of review affects the ability of shareholders (or stakeholders who might conceivably be owed fiduciary duties) to protect themselves from directors’ decisions about the distribution of
resources among the various corporate constituencies, even though
questions of distribution, as we have seen, are what the debate is
all about.53 In short, this Article argues that the business judgment
rule virtually eliminates shareholders’ ability to prevent corporate
decisions they find unfavorable, even those in which other stakeholders are favored.54 Likewise, if the law were changed such that
directors were to owe fiduciary duties to other stakeholders as well,
such stakeholders—holding all other rules of corporate law constant—would have virtually no power to prevent such unfavorable
decisions either.55 Regardless of who has the power to sue the board
for violations of fiduciary duty, the business judgment rule will
stand in their way, absent highly unusual circumstances that are
described below.56 The result is that fiduciary duties are largely
irrelevant to the corporate social responsibility debate.57
49 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
50 See infra Part III.
51 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 129.
52 See infra Section III.A.
53 See infra Part I.
54 See infra Section IV.A.
55 See infra Part IV.
56 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 601 n.268 (2003) [hereinafter
Director Primacy]; see also infra Part III.
57 See infra Part III.
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Note that this debate—as exemplified in the positions described above on the GM directors’ obligations—is mostly normative.58 Scholars argue that directors should or should not take a
certain course of action, and that corporate law should or should
not make that course of action mandatory.59 Importantly, this
Article does not put forth a normative argument but a purely descriptive one: It argues that this is how fiduciary duties work in
practice, without taking a position on how they should be.60
Of course, the economic and social concerns animating these
positions have also led to debates regarding other corporate legal
mechanisms to influence director conduct, like the proper incentive compensation for directors or whether employees (or other
stakeholders) should be entitled to elect a slate of directors to
represent their interests on the board.61 These mechanisms raise
a host of other concerns62 and are thus outside the scope of this
Article. For present purposes, this Article evaluates proposals to
extend directors’ fiduciary duties to stakeholders on the assumption—consistent with such proposals—that all other rules of corporate law remain unchanged, including the rule that shareholders
alone vote to elect directors.63
Assuming the directors use a good process (no breach of
the duty of care) and have no personal interest in the decision (no
breach of the duty of loyalty), the vast majority of corporate actions will be reviewed under the business judgment rule.64 The
business judgment rule requires the court to ask only whether the
directors had a good faith belief that their actions would benefit
the corporation and its shareholders and, if so, bars the court from
inquiring further.65 And, as explained below, this is an incredibly
See supra Introduction.
See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 549–50.
60 See infra Part IV.
61 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 576, 605.
62 See id. at 576–77.
63 See Epstein, supra note 8 (“American corporate law provides that boards
of directors are chosen solely by shareholders ....”); see also infra Section IV.B.
64 See infra Section III.A.
65 See, e.g., In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–
68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact,
believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through
58
59
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low bar: For any corporate action that directly benefits a nonshareholder group, there are multiple plausible explanations for
how this action redounds to the benefit of shareholders in the long
run.66 Because of this, directors rarely have trouble meeting the
minimal requirements of the business judgment rule.67
Thus, while fiduciary duties remain an effective tool for
preventing directors’ improper pursuit of their own self-interests,68
these duties have almost no impact on their decisions regarding
the distribution of resources among various corporate constituencies.69 As such, even if directors were to owe fiduciary duties to
stakeholders like employees or customers, this would not protect
them from the negative distributive effects of corporate decisionmaking, at least not without additional (and ill-advised) changes
to corporate law.70 Scholars who seek to secure increased power
or protection for a given corporate constituency—whether shareholders, employees, or otherwise—would do well to focus their
search on other legal mechanisms.71
Part I provides a brief overview of corporate fiduciary duties and recent scholarship discussing them.72 Part II explains
why the duty of loyalty is the most important fiduciary duty in the
corporate social responsibility debate, explains a rarely noted difference between two distinct definitions of the duty of loyalty—
one broad and one narrow—and argues that only the broader
definition would allow this duty to have any impact on directors’
distribution of corporate resources.73 Part III argues that Delaware
law, as a practical matter, enforces only the narrower definition

‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides no ground for director liability, so
long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests .... Thus, the
business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for
all good faith board decisions.”).
66 See infra Part III.
67 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 583 n.176; see also infra Section IV.B.
68 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 603 n.281; see also infra Section III.C.
69 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 588; see also infra Section IV.A.
70 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 588; see also infra Section IV.B.
71 See infra Section IV.C.
72 See infra Part I.
73 See infra Part II.
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of loyalty due to the triggering conditions of its judicial standards of
review.74 Part IV explains how this largely eliminates shareholders’ ability to effectively sue directors for decisions that favor other
stakeholders at their expense.75 It goes on to argue that, given
this is true for shareholders, it would likewise be true for employees, customers, or any other stakeholders, were they to be owed
fiduciary duties by directors.76 The Article concludes, then, that
the lively debate over to whom directors should owe fiduciary duties is not a debate worth having.77
I.FIGHTING OVER FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Basics
Before getting into the argument, let’s get a handle on the
components of corporate decision-making. Scholars often describe
the corporate form as a “nexus of contracts”—that is, a meeting
place for the various contributors to production,78 which this Article refers to as the corporation’s “constituencies.” Corporate law
gives directors the primary responsibility for managing the business
and affairs of the corporation,79 such as overseeing the corporation’s relationships with the constituencies involved.80 Accordingly,
as the following figure illustrates, while the various corporate
constituencies absolutely depend on one another, they almost never
deal with each other directly—that is, the shareholders would never
reach out to the employees to negotiate how much money to spend
on dividends versus bonuses.81 Instead, each constituency (or its
representatives) deal directly with the corporation (or representatives of the corporate legal entity), and the directors attempt to
put the various inputs to their most effective uses.82
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
76 See infra Part IV.
77 See infra Section IV.C.
78 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 552 n.31.
79 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020).
80 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 559–60.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 553–54.
74
75
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FIGURE 1: A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
Shareholders contribute their equity capital, creditors contribute their debt capital, managers and employees contribute their
expertise and labor, communities tend to contribute public goods
like roads and utilities (as well as other intangibles), customers
contribute revenue, and depending on the company, the environment may play a larger or smaller role.83 Of course, paired with
each contribution is a desired exchange.84 In return, shareholders maintain equity ownership of the corporation and rights to any
growth in its value; creditors have a contractual (i.e., superior to
shareholders) right to repayment of their money on predetermined
terms; managers and employees expect a salary; communities
collect taxes and fees; and customers do not part with their money
unless they believe the product they are buying is worth what
they pay for it.85 However, one important feature distinguishes
the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation from all the
others: As the above figure shows, under current corporate law,
shareholders are the only constituency for whom part of the exchange is that the directors owe them fiduciary duties.86
See id. at 552 n.31, 554.
See id. at 553 n.36.
85 See id. at 553 n.33, 564 n.81, 589, 597 n.245.
86 See supra Figure 1.
83
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It makes conceptual sense that shareholders enjoy the
benefit of directors’ fiduciary duties.87 Shareholders do not legally
“own” the corporation, but their equity ownership means they own
the residual economic rights to it—that is, even though shareholders have no contractual right to demand repayment of their
equity investment, their stock certificates are evidence of a legal
interest in the value of the corporation as a whole, both when that
value increases and decreases.88 Those economic rights come with
some limited means to control the business and affairs of the corporation, such as the right to vote for directors89 or approve amendments to the certificate of incorporation,90 but that is about where
shareholder control ends. No doubt shareholders’ right to elect
directors (and thus to refuse to re-elect them) is an important
restraint on director conduct.91 But while particularly egregious
or repeated misconduct is likely to result in a director being voted
out by shareholders, this voting right does not give shareholders
any direct say on directors’ decisions regarding the day-to-day
operations of the firm.92
Thus, corporate law often refers to this arrangement as the
“separation of ownership and control,”93 because while shareholders own the economic rights to the corporation, “the vast majority
of corporate decisions are made by the board of directors alone,
or by managers acting under delegated authority from the board
of directors.”94
The result looks just like the other relationships in which
the law imposes fiduciary duties, where one party is left vulnerable to another’s potential misconduct.95 Think about the many
See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 576.
See id. at 565 and accompanying notes.
89 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2009).
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
91 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 569–70 n.112.
92 See id.
93 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“One of the fundamental
tenets of Delaware corporate law provides for a separation of control and ownership .... An underlying premise for the imposition of fiduciary duties is a separation of legal control from beneficial ownership.”).
94 Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 559.
95 See id. at 579–80 n.162.
87
88
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ways directors could take advantage of the shareholders’ equity
contributions, given that shareholders have no right to demand
repayment.96 Directors could collect their paychecks but make decisions quickly and carelessly, allowing the shareholders’ money
to be wasted on poorly conceived ideas (likely a violation of the
fiduciary duty of care).97 Or they could use their corporate offices
to enrich themselves personally, such as by making sweetheart
deals with other businesses they own, or they could use their power
to benefit third parties who have no connection to the shareholders,
such as by donating all the corporation’s money to charitable groups
(likely violations of the duty of loyalty).98
While there is high-level agreement about which fiduciary
duty (loyalty or care) prevents which types of director misconduct
(as noted in the parentheticals in the above paragraph), little attention has been devoted to the duty of loyalty and the standard of review in the context of the corporate social responsibility debate.99
B. The Problem and Its Proposed Solutions
Legal scholars in various fields are no doubt aware of the
role fiduciary duties play to protect shareholders from corporate
directors taking undue advantage of them.100 Hence, many have
called attention to similar vulnerabilities among various stakeholders, and have proposed that directors should owe fiduciary
duties to them as well.101 But the dominant position in corporate
legal scholarship has steadfastly rejected all such proposals.102 This
Section provides a brief overview of this debate to illustrate what is
believed to be at stake;103 however, the rest of this Article argues
that scholars on both sides of this debate have misunderstood the
legal protection that comes with being owed directors’ fiduciary

See id. at 581–82.
See id.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 579–80 n.162; see also id. at 562. n.74.
100 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 593 n.221.
101 See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 3, at 975.
102 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 563.
103 See infra Section I.B.
96
97
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duties, and as a result have seriously overestimated the importance of fiduciary duties for corporate social responsibility.104
The amount of legal and economic scholarship positing that
boards of directors ought to run corporations for the exclusive
benefit of shareholders is, quite frankly, overwhelming.105 For many
legal scholars, this is a normative economic view that translates
naturally into the normative legal position that directors ought to
owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders alone.106 Many arguments
have been put forth to justify this view, but the two that stand out
are the agency-cost argument and the social-welfare argument.107
For the first, directors are seen as the shareholders’ agents, who
have been engaged to do the shareholders’ bidding but impose
“costs” any time they fail to act in the shareholders’ interest.108
As such, a norm that requires them to do so is appropriate.109
Second, the social-welfare argument posits that compliance with
this norm is best not just for shareholders but for all stakeholders
as well, and thus for the welfare of society as a whole.110 When
directors maximize shareholder wealth, the argument goes, this
ensures corporations do what they do best—namely, increase the
wealth of all their participants, which in turn will increase the
wealth of society in general.111
See infra Parts II, III, IV.
See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 563.
106 See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002).
107 See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 51 (2004);
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
108 For an overview of agency-cost theory, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976).
109 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 107, at 92. But see Stout,
supra note 106, at 1200–01 (arguing that while the shareholders’ agency cost
is the least bad reason to adopt a norm of shareholder wealth maximization,
there are a number of other costs and benefits that “ultimately cannot be
answered except on the basis of empirical evidence.”).
110 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 107, at 38.
111 See, e.g., id. at 38; Chen & Hanson, supra note 107, at 47; WILLIAM T.
ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 287–88 (2003) (“[F]raming the board’s mission as
104
105
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But stakeholders cannot leave well enough alone.112 They—
or, at least, a set of scholars and politicians on their behalf—also
want the protection of directors’ fiduciary duties.113 Over thirty
American states (with Delaware a notable exception) have passed
so-called “Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes” that permit
(or in some cases, require) corporate directors to take into account
the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders when
making corporate decisions.114 Scholars have gone so far as to
argue that such statutes should constitute an extension of the directors’ fiduciary duties and thus should be interpreted as creating a “duty not to harm” stakeholders, which would in turn permit
“direct legal action against the board by members of constituent
groups to enforce” this duty.115
In addition, many scholars have argued that recent Supreme Court decisions like Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission116 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores117 represent a
shift in corporate theory that places an unrealistic burden on state
corporate law to protect the interests of stakeholders.118 These
developments have prompted many responses, including from
the prominent corporate jurist Leo Strine and his co-author
Nicholas Walter, who concluded that such decisions strengthen

maximizing shareholder welfare also serves to maximize the welfare of other
corporate constituencies and society as a whole.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 261 n.45 (1989)
(“[M]aximizing gains to target shareholders serves the broader objectives of
shareholder and social welfare.”).
112 See Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 30 (1996).
113 See id.
114 See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV.
1973, 1989 (2009); see also 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.2-8(a)(1)–(2) (West 1990).
115 Mitchell, supra note 6, at 585.
116 See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits
the government from restricting independent expenditures for communications
by corporations, labor unions, and other associations).
117 See 573 U.S. 682, 689–91 (2014) (holding that closely held for-profit corporations are exempt from a generally applicable regulation its owners religiously
object to when there is a less restrictive means of furthering the law’s interest, according to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
118 See Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 639, 642–43 (2016).
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the “argument that corporations should have to consider the best
interests of all corporate constituencies and societies as a whole
when making decisions.”119 Others, like David Yosifon, responded
even more strongly, advancing the normative argument that the
law should “make directors fiduciaries of workers and consumers ...
because contract is insufficient to protect consumer interests and
because the backstop of government regulation is implausible under shareholder primacy,” and thus “directors must consider it
their [fiduciary] duty to ‘work hard and honestly’ not only to advance shareholder interests, but worker and consumer interests
as well.”120
In a similar vein, many have argued that the amount of fiduciary protection offered to corporate constituencies should vary
depending on a constituency’s representation in the firm’s corporate
governance or contribution to the firm.121 For example, Matthew
Bodie has argued that “employers are fiduciaries [to employees]
and must refrain from opportunism, especially when employees
have no voice in governance. However, in an organizational setting where employees genuinely participate in governing the firm,
the parties’ reciprocal fiduciary duties should be recalibrated to
require a balanced set of obligations.”122 And Kent Greenfield has
argued that corporations’ potential for “breaches of the public
trust or the imposition of costly externalities on stakeholders or
communities” justifies the conclusion that “directors should be held
to a fiduciary obligation to all of the firm’s stakeholders that varies
Strine & Walter, supra note 1, at 390. The authors provide an insightful analysis on the tension between the Citizens United decision and what
they call “conservative corporate theory.” Id. While their article does not focus on
policy recommendations, it seems that they nonetheless believe that directors’
consideration of nonshareholder constituencies should be a right, not a duty:
“If the for-profit corporation really is a citizen like any other, and a distinct
one from that of any of its constituencies, including its stockholders, then its
board must be entitled to have it act as a patriotic, moral citizen imbued with
a conscience.” Id. (emphasis added).
120 The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236.
121 See Bodie, supra note 2, at 862.
122 Bodie, supra note 2, at 819; see also Pollman, supra note 118, at 689
(“Because state corporate law does not include employees within the governance framework, give them a voice in the corporation, or protect their interests,
it is particularly important that external employee-protective laws be given effect.” (emphasis added)).
119
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according to the nature of the stakeholders’ contributions to the
success of the firm.”123 Still others have focused on the effects that
corporate activity has on employees in the era of globalization
and made normative arguments that corporate directors should
owe employees fiduciary duties that include specific prescriptive
obligations: “Directors [sh]ould owe fiduciary obligations to employees, including the duty to provide information and consult with
them about strategic decisions that affect job security and working conditions.”124
In sum, scholars in both the pro-shareholder and prostakeholder camps disagree widely, on a normative level, about to
whom corporate directors should owe fiduciary duties.125 But they
almost all agree on a descriptive level: that fiduciary duties play
a meaningful role in determining how directors distribute resources
to each corporate constituency, given that those who are owed fiduciary duties have the power to sue directors to block distributive decisions they find unfair.126 This Article now turns to argue
the contrary.
II.A CLOSER LOOK AT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Discussions of fiduciary duties tend to lead with the comment that fiduciary law has eluded precise elaboration, so this
discussion will be no exception.127 Indeed, for several years, a
Greenfield, supra note 3, at 947, 949, 975–76.
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
899, 901, 904 (1993).
125 Compare id. at 902, with EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 107, at 38.
126 See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 124, at 902, 950, 955, 958–59; In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
127 See, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 1 (2010) (“The word ‘fiduciary’
recurs frequently in legal discussion, but the understanding of the meaning of
the word remains very confused.”); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 237 (2011) (calling the law of fiduciaries “unusually
vexing”); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:
Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045
(1991) (“Fiduciary relationships have occupied a significant body of AngloAmerican law and jurisprudence for over 250 years, yet the precise nature of
the fiduciary relationship remains a source of confusion and dispute.”); D. Gordon
Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
123
124
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leading viewpoint was that fiduciary relationships were indefinable.128 However, in recent decades several scholars have hit
general fiduciary law with systematic treatments, formulating
both descriptive and normative accounts of the fiduciary obligation to cast it as a coherent whole, or at least to find within it a
coherent thread.129 While this Article is greatly indebted to those
projects, it does not provide a systematic elaboration. Instead, it
focuses on the narrow question of how effectively shareholders
(or anyone conceivably owed a fiduciary duty) can rely on these
duties to protect themselves from directors’ decisions that favor
other corporate stakeholders at their expense.130
A. Which Fiduciary Duty Are We Talking About?
There is widespread agreement among scholars that directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders function to secure the
shareholder wealth maximization norm of corporate conduct—
even among those who reject this norm as a matter of policy.131

1400 (2002) (opening his essay by stating that “[f]iduciary law is messy”); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2001) [hereinafter
Blair & Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law] (calling fiduciary duty an “elusive legal concept”).
128 See L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 73
(1962) (“The word ‘fiduciary,’ we find, is not definitive of a single class of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply. Each equitable
remedy is available only in a limited number of fiduciary situations.”); PAUL
FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1 (40th Anniversary ed. 2016) (“As with many
of the general doctrines and remedies of Equity, the legacy of this neglect of
‘fiduciaries’ and of ‘fiduciary duties’ has been doubt and confusion ... [T]he
term ‘fiduciary’ is itself one of the most ill-defined, if not altogether misleading terms in our law.”). For a brief summary of this idea’s influence on the
scholarship on fiduciary law, see Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 237 (Andrew S. Gold &
Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Fiduciary Relationship].
129 See Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 1, 3 (2016); Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 128, at 267–69; Smith,
supra note 127, at 1400; Miller, supra note 127, at 239; CONAGLEN, supra note
127, at i, 1; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993).
130 See infra Part IV.
131 Alces, supra note 15, at 247. A notable exception is the work of Margaret
Blair and Lynn Stout, which has argued that current corporate law actually
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But the precise way in which corporate fiduciary duties might
fulfill this function has received rather limited scholarly attention.132 This Article fills that gap and, in so doing, concludes that
much of this scholarly agreement is unfounded.133
To put a finer point on it, let us ask a question. If you were a
shareholder of General Motors who wanted to prevent your elected
directors from distributing surplus corporate wealth to GM employees, which fiduciary duty would you use to crack the whip?134
This question is not about strategic litigation decisions like which
standard of review applies or whether directors are likely to be
exempt from monetary damages for violating certain duties. Rather,
it is intended as a basic 1L issue-spotter exam question: Which
legal rule—in particular, which fiduciary duty—applies to this
precise type of director misconduct? In Delaware, there are two
of them: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.135 How would
each of them would square up?

does not require directors to pursue shareholder wealth maximization. But
see Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note
27, at 248–51.
132 See, e.g., id. at 248–49.
133 See infra Conclusion.
134 Of course, any seasoned scholar or practitioner of corporate law understands that a decision like this one is, in practice, beyond the reach of shareholders to prevent. See, e.g., Peter A. Atkins et al., Putting to Rest the Debate
Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Current Corporate Law, SKADDEN
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/08/put
ting-to-rest-the-debate [https://perma.cc/39XM-XDPT] (stating that “the shareholder primacy rule, which governs Delaware corporations ... has sufficient room
to accommodate socially responsible corporate expenditures—including those
aimed at addressing the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders—determined in
the lawful exercise of a board’s business judgment”). Nonetheless, scholars have
consistently insisted that Delaware directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders
protect shareholders from directors’ undue favoritism towards stakeholders.
The point of this hypothetical is to test that claim: if shareholders really can
compel directors to exclude the interests of all other stakeholders, which aspect
of directors’ fiduciary duties so requires them to do so?
The flip side of this, as argued below, is equally important to scholars on
the “pro-stakeholder” side of the corporate social responsibility debate. If the
fiduciary duties that corporate directors owe to their shareholders do not have
the power to prevent decisions that are unfavorable to shareholders, it would
do little good for other stakeholder groups to secure a change in the law in
which the directors also owe a fiduciary duty to them.
135 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367,
369–70 (Del. 2006) (referencing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
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The duty of care, for its part, requires corporate directors
to act carefully and on an informed basis.136 Note that these are
not substantive requirements.137 That is because in Delaware there
is no substantive duty of care: “Due care in the decision-making
context is process due care only.”138 This means that when directors
make decisions after careful deliberation of all material information
that is reasonably available, they have met the standard of conduct,
and the standard of review by which Delaware courts will evaluate
their conduct is the business judgment rule.139 This is Delaware’s
most deferential standard of review, as explained in the next Part,
under which their “decisions will not be disturbed [by the court]
if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”140
Even without the business judgment rule’s application,
though, the duty of care would be of little use to the GM shareholders who wish to prevent the payment of employee bonuses.141
So long as the directors’ decision to pay bonuses is made with all

361 (Del. 1993)). While older Delaware decisions have treated the duty of
good faith as an independent fiduciary duty, Stone v. Ritter clarified that:
[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of
a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and
loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish
an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.
Id. at 370; see also In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 52, 64, 66. Under Delaware
law, violations of good faith include acting with “an actual intent to do harm”
to the corporation, and a failure to act which amounts to an “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.” Id. So long as
the decision to pay bonuses is made with the best interests of the corporation
in mind—say, to promote employee welfare and morale, and thereby increase
productivity—there can be no argument that it was made in bad faith. Because of
this, the duty of good faith is not a promising route for shareholders to interfere
with corporate directors’ decisions to distribute wealth within the corporation.
136 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 64.
137 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
138 Id. at 264 (“As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to
exercise ‘substantive due care,’ we should note that such a concept is foreign
to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’
judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.”).
139 See id. at 254–55, 257, 259.
140 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see also infra Section III.A.
141 See infra Section II.A.
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due care and consideration—e.g., by reviewing projections of productivity increases, considering the various ways the funds might
be used—the duty of care is satisfied.142 The obligation to take
care contains no implicit requirement to orient that care toward
a specified end, such as maximizing wealth for the shareholders.143
To put it another way, the duty of care is completely “agnostic” about who must benefit from such care.144 The duty of care
thus helps maximize shareholder wealth by preventing losses from
various types of carelessness and negligence—say, by rushing
through a decision without evaluating all the potential consequences it may produce.145 But it does not include any requirement that shareholders are the primary beneficiary of such care,
let alone that they can litigate on directors’ duty of care to prevent the payment of employee bonuses.146 In short, this obligation
is inapposite to directors’ distributive decisions that are made carefully and deliberately, whether or not they favor shareholders.147
If shareholders want to block the employee bonuses, then,
their only chance is to rely on the duty of loyalty.148 The standard
of conduct for corporate directors who owe a duty of loyalty to
shareholders is conceptually simple.149 Corporate directors must
act for the “exclusive benefit” of the shareholders, such that they
are required to make every decision with the singular goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.150 Understood in this way, a director
violates the duty of loyalty not only when she acts in her own selfinterest, but also when she acts in the interest of any nonshareholder group—even if she has no personal interest in that group’s
benefit.151 As such, this formulation of the duty of loyalty (if
Delaware courts were actually to enforce it this way) is a perfect
See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
See id. at 264.
144 See Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720 (Del. 1971).
145 See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000) (“[B]oards that
have ‘failed to exercise due care are frequently boards that have been rushed.’”).
146 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2020); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
147 See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 921.
148 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988).
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
142
143
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match for the GM shareholders’ employee bonuses problem.152 If
the directors distribute the surplus funds to the employees (or
any other stakeholder), a colorable argument can be made that
they have not acted for the “exclusive benefit” of shareholders, have
thus violated their fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholders, and
are subject to liability for doing so.153
The only problem with this is that—thanks to the standard of review—the version of the duty of loyalty that is actually
enforced by Delaware courts is narrower than this standard of
conduct suggests.154
B. Two Definitions of Loyalty
So far, this Article has singled out the duty of loyalty as
the sole fiduciary duty with any potential to govern board decisions that distribute wealth within a corporation.155 This Section
takes a closer look at the duty of loyalty so as to test how successfully it might be employed toward this end by shareholders.156
It explains that courts and scholars have advanced two distinct
See id.
See id.
154 See infra Part III.
155 The duty of loyalty’s importance in corporate law comports with its centrality in fiduciary law generally, where scholars have described it as the distinctive fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 128, at 1 (“There
is little doubt that fiduciary relationships generate at least one distinctive legal
duty, the duty of loyalty.”); UNIF. TR. CODE § 802, cmt. 1 (Nat’l Conf. Comm’rs on
Unif. L. 2010) (stating that the duty of loyalty is “perhaps the most fundamental
duty of the trustee”); Gregory S. Alexander, Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 776 (1999) (“Unlike the contractual relationship, undivided loyalty is the heart of the fiduciary relationship, especially
for property fiduciaries like trustees and estate executors.”); CONAGLEN, supra
note 127, at 1 (citing Mothew and stating that “[t]he concept of loyalty is now
well established as the core—indeed the defining—concept of fiduciary doctrine”);
J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 48 (Carswell Co. Ltd. ed., 1981) (“[T]he
terms fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty are so much co-extensive as to be, in
effect, alternate descriptions of the same thing.”). Some scholars even go so far as
to argue it is the only duty that is properly called a fiduciary one. See, e.g., D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1400–11 (2002); FINN, supra note 128, at 330–32; FRANKEL, supra
note 33, at 129.
156 See infra Section II.B.
152
153
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definitions of the duty of loyalty—one broad and one narrow—and
from this, only the broad definition of loyalty would allow shareholders to prevent directors from favoring nonshareholder constituencies at their expense.157 This matters because, as explained
in the next Part, only duty of loyalty claims that fit within the narrow definition are evaluated under a more demanding standard
of review.158
To begin, it is helpful to distinguish between two different
types of disloyal conduct by directors: actions that are (a) selfinterested, in that they elevate the director’s interests over shareholders’ interests, and actions that are (b) stakeholder-interested, in
that they elevate the interests of a nonshareholder constituency
(like employees or customers) over shareholders’ interests.159
With this distinction in mind, it is easier to see the difference between the two definitions of the duty of loyalty that repeatedly show
up in legal scholarship, for which the following terms are used
as shorthand:
1. Exclusive Benefit: Directors must act always for
the “exclusive benefit” of shareholders.160 Result:
Directors may not act in their own interests or
in the interests of others—including stakeholders
like employees, creditors, customers, or communities.161
2. Disinterestedness: Directors must not act for their
own benefit at the expense of the corporation or its
shareholders.162 Result: Directors may not act to
See infra Section II.B
See infra Part III.
159 See Smith, supra 127, at 1440; see also Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 27, at 289.
160 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 24, at 23 (“Directors and officers are legally
required to manage a corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders,
and protection for other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided
by contract.”).
161 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 148, at 1108.
162 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (describing the
judicial inquiry into “the independence and disinterestedness of the directors”)
(emphasis added)); see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“The
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
157
158
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benefit their own interests, but they may act to
benefit the interests of others, including stakeholders.163
Outside of discussions concerning corporate social responsibility, the difference between these two definitions of loyalty may
be insignificant: In most fiduciary relationships, the inherent risk
is that the fiduciary has the (tautological) incentive to act in her
own self-interest, not that she might use her position to improperly
benefit a third party she has absolutely no relationship with and
no legal duty to serve.164 Maybe that is why it is commonplace for
scholars to treat these two definitions of the duty of loyalty as completely interchangeable.165 But in the corporate social responsibility debate, this minor difference has incredible importance.166

that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”); MICHAEL P.
DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 250 (1995) (“The essence of a
loyalty violation is that directors have subverted the decision-making process
to benefit themselves or some party to whom they are beholden (such as a controlling shareholder) and that the benefit has come at the expense of the corporation or its shareholders.”).
163 See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director’s Guidebook,
49 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1254–55 (1994).
164 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 148, at 1119 (“[T]he risk always exists that the trustee of an employee benefit plan will take self-interested action
(for example, siphoning assets from the pension fund) that will operate to the
detriment of the beneficiaries (employers and employees).”).
165 See, e.g., Bodie, supra note 2, at 826 (“In particular, agents have the duty
of loyalty to the principal—the duty to ‘act solely for the benefit of the principal in
all matters connected with his agency.’ This self-abnegation is a critical aspect of
the agency relationship, because it balances out the agent’s power to step into
the shoes of the principal and act on the principal’s behalf.” (emphases added));
Blair & Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, supra note 127, at 1782–83 ([T]he keystone of the fiduciary relationship lies in the fiduciary’s commitment to abandon self-interest and promote
her beneficiary’s welfare instead of her own.”); ABA Committee on Corporate
Laws, supra note 163, at 1254–55 (“The duty of loyalty requires directors to
exercise their powers in the interests of the corporation and not in the directors’
own interest or in the interest of another person (including a family member) or
organization. Simply put, directors should not use their corporate position to make
a personal profit or gain or for other personal advantage.” (emphases added));
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 107, at 103 (defining the duty of loyalty
as an obligation “to maximize the investors’ wealth rather than one’s own”).
166 See infra Section II.C.
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Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this is by spatial representation. In the following figure, each definition is represented
by a circle, and inside that circle is a description of the types actions
that are prohibited by that definition.167 Each circle is inclusive
of all within it, including other circles (if any).168

FIGURE 2: WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY EACH DEFINITION OF LOYALTY
As seen above, the exclusive benefit definition contains the
disinterestedness definition.169 Accordingly, the exclusive benefit
definition prohibits all the actions described within its circle: both
actions that benefit nonshareholder constituencies (stakeholderinterested actions) and actions that benefit the director (selfinterested actions).170 The disinterestedness definition, for its part,
is the narrower of the two, as it prohibits only those actions that
benefit the director.171 Put another way, a definition of disinterestedness fails to expressly prohibit the fiduciary from taking stakeholder interested actions.172

See infra Figure 2.
See id.
169 See supra Figure 2.
170 See id.
171 See id.; see also DOOLEY, supra note 162, at 250.
172 See supra Figure 2; see also DOOLEY, supra note 162, at 250.
167
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It is worth clarifying at this point that these definitions describe the purpose of any corporate action, and not the means of
bringing it about or the result that it produces.173 Even strict advocates of what I am calling exclusive benefit agree that directors
can cause the corporation to enter contracts with employees or customers that are beneficial to both parties.174 But these two definitions diverge on whether maximizing shareholder wealth must
be the directors’ exclusive goal, or whether directors are required
merely to avoid transactions in which their own self-enrichment
is a goal.175
While the definitions of disinterestedness and exclusive benefit overlap in terms of some covered conduct, they are not perfectly
coextensive.176 Again, this all reeks of abstraction, so let’s get concrete. Imagine a GM director who takes two different actions: (A)
causes GM to enter a ten-year contract with a supplier that she,
the director, also happens to own a controlling interest in, on terms
that are much better than the supplier could otherwise get on
the market (“sweetheart self-dealing”); and (B) pays bonuses to GM
employees across the board at a much higher level than comparable companies would pay (“outrageous employee bonuses”). These
actions are mapped on Figure 2 above.
Accordingly, it can be seen that action (A), the sweetheart
self-dealing, violates both exclusive benefit (in that it was not done
for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders) and disinterestedness
(in that it was done for the director’s own benefit).177 By contrast,
action (B), the outrageous employee bonuses, violates only the principle of exclusive benefit, in that it was not done for the shareholders’ exclusive benefit.178 Action (B) does not violate the principle
of disinterestedness because it was not done for the director’s
own benefit.179
See supra Section II.B.
See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 148, at 1119 (“Moreover, because the
employer and the employees continually monitor the performance of the trustee of
an employee benefit plan, there may be less need for strict fiduciary duties that
limit the discretion of the trustee to engage in conduct that may be mutually
beneficial to both groups.”).
175 See supra Section II.B.
176 See id.
177 See supra Figure 2.
178 See id.
179 See id.
173
174
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C. Stakeholder-Interested Conduct
Here is why this difference matters. Obviously, directors
funneling corporate resources into their own pockets is undesirable to shareholders and stakeholders alike, and thus has never
been an issue of much concern in the corporate social responsibility
debate.180 So, the enforcement of disinterestedness is important,
but uncontroversial and irrelevant to the issue at hand.181 Instead,
what matters in the corporate social responsibility debate is how
directors distribute corporate resources among everyone else, and
the corresponding rights of corporate constituencies to challenge
those decisions when they find them unfair.182 And unless the duty
of loyalty is enforced in its broader definition—exclusive benefit—it
will have no relevance to distributive decisions at all.183
For shareholders to effectively challenge directors’ stakeholder interested conduct on a theory of a violation of fiduciary
duty, Delaware law must enforce the broader principle of exclusive benefit.184 Otherwise—if the duty of loyalty were enforced
merely as disinterestedness—directors could not be punished for
providing benefits to employees or customers at the shareholders’ expense.185 But, as the following Part explains, in shareholder plaintiff suits against corporate directors, the standard of
review in Delaware courts results in the enforcement of only the
narrow definition of the duty of loyalty.186
See Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
See id.
182 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 24, at 23 (“Directors and officers are legally
required to manage a corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders,
and protection for other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided
by contract.”).
183 See supra Section II.B. To put it another way, the entire focus of the corporate social responsibility debate concerns director conduct that falls in the outer
ring of Figure 2—a director’s actions that seek to benefit stakeholders but do not
benefit the director herself. See supra Figure 2. Such stakeholder-interested
conduct includes all corporate transactions in which a director does not have
a material self-interest (beyond her role as a director) and with which she provides
a benefit for a nonshareholder corporate constituency like employees or customers.
See supra Section II.B.
184 See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 148, at 1108.
185 See supra Section II.B.
186 See infra Part III.
180
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III.FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Debates about fiduciary duties in the context of corporate
social responsibility are based on the shared descriptive premise
that shareholders currently have the legal power to root out stakeholder interested conduct by holding directors accountable to the
exclusive benefit principle.187 But, as this Article argues next, this
descriptive premise is mistaken.188 The reason for this is because
of the enormous difference in Delaware corporate law between the
standard of conduct governing corporate directors’ behavior and
the standard of review with which a Delaware court will evaluate such conduct and determine whether to impose liability or
grant relief.189 To be clear, this Article does not dispute that exclusive benefit is the standard of conduct that Delaware directors are required to follow.190 Instead, this Article shows that the
standard of review for shareholder claims of directors’ fiduciary
violations remains the default rule of absolute deference to directors, except in rare circumstances.191 For all practical purposes,
then, this limits the duty of loyalty in Delaware to the principle
of disinterestedness.192
The vast difference between the standard of conduct and
standard of review in Delaware has received much attention from
scholars and courts,193 but there has yet to be a thorough explanation of the implications of this disparity for the fight over fiduciary duties—a gap this Article fills.194 For example, the Supreme
Court of Delaware has not been shy in admitting that “[b]ecause
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule
is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting,
See FRANKEL, supra note 33, at 124–25.
See infra Section III.A.
189 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993) (“In
the real world ... the standards of review in corporate law pervasively diverge from
the standards of conduct.”).
190 In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424 (“As it has long done,
Delaware law still requires directors to put shareholder interests ahead of those
of nonshareholders.”).
191 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 442–43.
192 See id. at 452.
193 See id. at 438, 442–43.
194 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
187
188
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the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review
frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.”195 As explained below, courts and scholars have provided
various rationales in support of each applicable standard of review: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire
fairness.196 And, importantly, the business judgment rule applies
in all but highly unusual circumstances.197
In general, there are not a lot of corporate law cases, in
Delaware or elsewhere, involving directors who have given away
corporate resources to employees or customers simply because they
believed there were moral or charitable reasons for doing so.198 To
the contrary, when directors attempt to justify their decisions with
regard to nonshareholder interests, courts are much more likely
to see through those attempts as pretext for self-interest.199 Obviously, it is little more than a tautology to say that directors are
likely to act in their own self-interest.200 Conversely, it is not surprising that very few directors would choose to direct resources
to nonshareholders in cases where they have no self-interest in
doing so, and furthermore have a legal duty not to do so.201 It
should not be surprising, then, that cases involving stakeholderinterested conduct—when done for the sole purpose of enriching
stakeholders—are few and far between.202
Of course, this is precisely why pro-stakeholder theorists
have argued that directors should owe fiduciary duties to nonshareholders: to give directors the proper incentives to protect the
interests of constituencies that are particularly vulnerable.203 Yet,
the point of this Article is that even if the law were to impose on
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989)
(quoting AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del.
Ch. 1986)).
196 Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(“Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director decision-making:
the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness.”).
197 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 998 (2002) [hereinafter Interpreting Nonshareholder].
198 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424, 1427–28.
199 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 453.
200 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1445.
201 See id. at 1424, 1427–28.
202 See id.
203 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 93–94.
195
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directors a fiduciary duty to nonshareholder groups, like employees,
whatever vulnerabilities that currently exist would continue without remediation.204
A. The Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment Rule
The ultimate culprit for why Delaware shareholders cannot
hold directors to an exclusive benefit principle is the business
judgment rule.205 Despite the widespread agreement that Delaware
law requires corporate directors to pursue the exclusive benefit
of shareholders,206 it is no secret that Delaware courts nonetheless tolerate almost all director decisions that favor nonshareholder
constituencies—or what this Article calls stakeholder interested
conduct—even when they appear to do so at shareholders’ expense.207 To explain this tolerance, scholars routinely point to the
standard of review in Delaware that is both the default rule and
the most deferential to corporate directors, the so-called business
judgment rule.208 But no scholar has yet addressed how this deferential standard of review impacts the fight over fiduciary duties
in the corporate social responsibility debate.209
In its simplest formulation, the business judgment rule is
“a presumption that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.”210 This is “Delaware’s default standard of review”
that applies when a shareholder plaintiff sues directors to challenge a decision directors have made.211 To rebut the business
judgment rule’s presumption, the plaintiffs’ complaint:
must support a reasonable inference that in making the challenged decision, the board of directors breached either its duty
of loyalty or its duty of care. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy that
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 441, 443.
206 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424.
207 See Alces, supra note 15, at 246, 248.
208 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 441, 443.
209 See id. at 437–38.
210 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
211 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 43 (Del. Ch. 2013).
204
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burden, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.212

In short, Delaware courts refuse to scrutinize the substance of a
corporate decision unless the shareholder plaintiff adequately
alleges that the decision-making directors violated one of their
fiduciary duties.213
In such cases, the business judgment rule applies.214 Assuming the directors were disinterested and exercised due care in
reaching a decision, as this Article has throughout, the remainder
of the rule requires that the court determine whether the decision was made in good faith.215 And because the burden of proof
rests with the shareholder plaintiffs (as in any litigation), the
directors’ decision will not be overturned unless the shareholders
can establish that the director acted in bad faith.216 However, as
the following Part explains, this task is exceedingly difficult for
shareholders due to the nature of corporate decision-making.217
That is, for every action that can be characterized as stakeholder
interested, there are several plausible explanations for how that
action will likely redound to the benefit of shareholders in the
long run.218 As a result, the number of instances in which it can
be established that directors did not have a good faith belief that

Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (footnotes and internal
quotations omitted).
213 Id. at 705–06.
214 Id.
215 See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL
7036, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“The business judgment form of judicial review
encompasses three elements: a threshold review of the objective financial interests of the board whose decision is under attack (i.e., independence), a review
of the board’s subjective motivation (i.e., good faith), and an objective review
of the process by which it reached the decision under review (i.e., due care).”)
(citations omitted).
216 Id. (“If [the] plaintiff cannot show a prima facie case of, or, if such a case is
made out, the balance of the evidence does not establish, bad faith or gross
negligence[,] then there is, in my opinion, no basis to issue an injunction or to
impose liability.”).
217 Id. at 1156–58.
218 See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 999–1000; see also
supra Section IV.A.
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their actions would ultimately redound to the benefit of shareholders is vanishingly small.219
The reasons behind the rule are motivated not by concerns
about corporate social responsibility, but rather by something
more foundational to corporate law: the balance between director
authority and accountability.220 “Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle,
codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”221 As such, “[t]he business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power
granted to Delaware directors.”222 Conceptually speaking, if the
Court of Chancery could overrule every corporate decision no matter
how small or inconsequential, then it would not be directors who
have the ultimate authority over the business and affairs of a
Delaware corporation, but instead Delaware judges.223 The business judgment rule therefore reflects the rather sensible policy
that judges—who do not have the experience, knowledge, and expertise of corporate management—should not override the decisions
of those who do.224 One court put it well:
The rule was developed to protect directors’ judgments on questions of corporate governance. Questions like “should we buy a
See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 995–96. In practice,
the conduct of Delaware directors is often even more shielded from judicial review
thanks to the demand requirement in shareholder derivative suits. In Delaware,
[a] stockholder may not pursue a derivative suit to assert a claim
of the corporation unless the stockholder: (a) has first demanded
that the directors pursue the corporate claim and the directors
have wrongfully refused to do so; or (b) establishes that pre-suit
demand is excused because the directors are deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of
the litigation.
Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008) (citations omitted). And the
only grounds for successfully arguing demand futility are the same as those
for preventing application of the business judgment rule: improper director
self-interest. Id.
220 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38 at 102–09.
221 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
222 Id. at 872.
223 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 122.
224 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 444.
219
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new truck today?” or “should we give Joe a raise?” are simplistically, types of business judgments which the rule was developed
to protect. Courts have no place substituting their judgments
for that of the directors.225

In other words, the business judgment rule is not a tangential or accidental component of Delaware corporate law.226 Rather, it reflects a crucial and central policy about the allocation of
decision-making authority in the modern corporation.227 If courts do
not give some level of deference to corporate directors but are
instead required (or even permitted) to evaluate the substantive
merits of their every decision, judges become the ultimate decision-makers of corporate law.228 Giving the Delaware judiciary
the ability to regularly override board decisions would effectively
install it as a kind of “uber” board over nearly every public company in the United States.229 The business judgment rule thus
ensures that does not happen, and instead allows duly elected
directors to retain the ultimate authority over the corporation’s
resources.230 Eliminating or limiting the business judgment rule,
then, would have drastic implications not just for the corporate
social responsibility debate, but for the whole of corporate law.231
While a full defense of the business judgment rule is outside the scope of this Article, based on the discussion above it is
sufficient to say that any decision to eliminate or restrict the rule’s
application should not be made lightly.232 And when it comes to
the debate on corporate social responsibility, the consequences
are profound.233 When the business judgment rule applies to a
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995)
(“The business judgment rule has traditionally operated to shield directors from
personal liability arising out of completed actions involving operational issues” so
long as they are “acting without self-interest and in good faith.”).
226 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 83–84.
227 See id. at 87 (“[T]he business judgment rule is the principal mechanism
by which corporate law resolves th[e] tension [between director authority and
accountability].”).
228 See id. at 122.
229 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424.
230 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 87.
231 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424.
232 See supra Section III.A.
233 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
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particular corporate decision, shareholders cannot hold directors
to any substantive standard of conduct at all, whether it be exclusive benefit or otherwise.234 This affords directors wide latitude to engage in stakeholder interested conduct of various kinds.235
Thus, for shareholder plaintiffs who hope to prevent such conduct
by enforcing the exclusive benefit principle, what matters are the
circumstances under which the protections of the business judgment rule are removed.236 There are two distinct scenarios in
which a Delaware court will refuse to apply the business judgment
rule and instead apply a heightened standard of review.237
The first scenario under which a heightened standard of
review is triggered has been characterized as “structural” or “ownership claim” issues—that is, decisions involving contested changes
over corporate ownership.238 While the following Section addresses these types of claims more thoroughly, it is worth pausing
here to draw attention to the other half of the equation: Anytime
a corporate decision does not involve a change in corporate ownership—which, unsurprisingly, describes the vast majority of corporate decisions—the business judgment rule applies and Delaware
courts will not substitute their judgment for the judgment of directors.239 Leading corporate legal scholars like Stephen Bainbridge
and Bayless Manning have respectively referred to these matters
as a company’s “operational”240 or “enterprise”241 issues. But just
See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 97 (describing with approval application of the business judgment rule in Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968), and noting “the court did not require [the director
defendants] to show either that such considerations [of potential legitimate business reasons] motivated their decisions or that the decision otherwise redounded
to the corporation’s benefit.”).
235 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 444.
236 See Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why
Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85
OR. L. REV. 993, 1017 (2006).
237 See infra notes 238–56 and accompanying text.
238 See supra Part I.
239 See id.
240 Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 976 (“[O]ne thing can be
said with considerable confidence: shareholder challenges to operational decisions
usually fail.”).
241 Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
after Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 5 (1985).
234
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because these issues do not involve changes in corporate ownership, does not mean they are not incredibly important for the corporation as a whole.242 As Manning provides:
An example of an enterprise issue would be a decision by the
board to expand or contract the company’s steel operations in
the United States .... A shareholder has an economic stake in major enterprise issues, of course. If a slide rule manufacturer expands its traditional business just as electronic calculators
sweep the market, the company will go broke; the result of the
board’s decision on that enterprise issue will be that shareholders (or some later generation of shareholders) will lose
their investment.243

Despite the potential for enterprise or operational issues to have
major economic impact, in other words, they will nonetheless be
evaluated under the business judgment rule.244
The second scenario is alleged duty of loyalty violations.245
To be sure, it is often said that the business judgment rule protects directors against alleged violations of the duty of care and
not against alleged violations of the duty of loyalty.246 According to
this shorthand, corporate directors who violate their duty of loyalty
to shareholders will be reviewed with the strictest standard of
See id.
See id.
244 Id. at 6 (“Our corporation laws grant to directors exclusive power, or
primary power, or shared power to decide most enterprise issues and many
ownership claim issues.”).
245 See supra Part I.
246 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 129, at 433 (“To equity investors, the duty of loyalty is strong but the duty of care is weak (the ‘business
judgment rule’ blocks inquiry, and negligent management is not actionable).”);
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It),
26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 495 (2001) (explaining that prior to Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), which is discussed in greater detail below,
“[c]orporate law provided two general standards of review of management conduct: the business judgment rule, applicable to claims that management violated
its duty of care; and the intrinsic fairness test, applicable to claims that management violated its duty of loyalty.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of
Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3293–94 (2013) [hereinafter Geography of Revlon-Land]; see also Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(“The ‘business judgment rule,’ however, yields to the rule of undivided loyalty.
This great rule of law is designed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid
the temptation of self-interest.’” (internal quotations omitted)).
242
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review under Delaware law: the entire fairness standard.247 But,
as we have seen, the precise definition of the duty of loyalty makes
all the difference.248 And as explained below, the duty of loyalty
violations that trigger the entire fairness standard are limited to
violations of its narrower formulation, what this Article has called
“disinterestedness”.249 Disinterested directors who allegedly
violate only the exclusive benefit principle will thus remain protected by the highly deferential business judgment rule.250 The
result, as explained in the following Section, is that directors have
an enormous amount of freedom to provide benefits to nonshareholder constituencies, and because these decisions are “nonreviewable,”251 there is nothing shareholders can do about it.252
B. The Duty of Loyalty and Enhanced Scrutiny
Shareholders have more power to hold directors to the exclusive benefit principle when their decisions are reviewed under
Delaware’s intermediate standard of review: enhanced scrutiny.253
Delaware courts developed this standard in response to the takeover boom of the 1980s, and it is seen as a middle ground between
the highly deferential business judgment rule and the exacting
standard of entire fairness (discussed in the following Section).254
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438 (“The duty of loyalty concerns
the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer in taking
action, or failing to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest.”).
248 See id.
249 See id.; see also Section III.B.
250 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438.
251 See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in
Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44
BUS. LAW. 503, 521 (1988) (“It is hard to find reported examples of these “nonreviewable” decisions precisely because it is so well understood that they cannot profitably be made the subject of lawsuits. A dividend may be illegal because it
exceeds the amount permissible under the statute, but we have no concept of
a “negligent” dividend policy even though hindsight indicates that a different
allocation between retention and payout of earnings may have been wiser.”
Similarly, courts will not entertain stockholder complaints that the board should
have directed management to devote more effort to research and development
or to manufacture this, rather than that, product or that X would have made
a better chief financial officer than Y.”).
252 See id. at 521.
253 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. Ch. 2010).
254 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 12, at 106.
247
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The problem, however, is that Delaware courts apply enhanced
scrutiny only to a very limited subset of corporate actions that
involve contested claims to the corporation’s ownership.255 For
everything else, the default is still the business judgment rule,
including for most of the decisions that animate the corporate
social responsibility debate: the compensation and treatment of
employees, the welfare and safety of customers, the protection of
the environment and the community, etc.256 Corporate policies and
decisions in all of these categories are never subjected to enhanced
judicial scrutiny—but because the cases applying this standard
are often discussed in debates about corporate social responsibility, this Article addresses them below.257
1. Defensive Measures
The first type of corporate action that receives enhanced
scrutiny in Delaware courts is directors’ responses to unsolicited
or hostile takeover attempts by third parties, which are evaluated
under the 1985 case of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.258 In Unocal,
Unocal directors adopted a selective share repurchase (a predecessor of the “poison pill” defense) that made it much more difficult
for the prospective acquirer to complete his tender offer successfully.259 The court reviewed the rationale of the business judgment
rule and concluded that nothing about an unsolicited tender
offer changes Delaware directors’ standard of conduct or the “basic
principle that directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”260 Instead, it is the
presence of the inherent conflict of interest—“that the directors
may ... have acted solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office”—that justifies a heightened standard of
review.261
Enhanced scrutiny thus imposes a check on directors’ discretion, at least when compared to the discretion they command
Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 981.
Id.
257 See, e.g., id. at 981–84, supra Section III.B.1.
258 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 955.
261 Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964)).
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in the operational context.262 When implementing defensive measures, this discretion is subject to two tests.263 First, directors may
not respond to “any perceived threat by any Draconian means
available.”264 And second, it is required that any defensive measures be reasonable:
[A] defensive measure [will] come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule [if it is] reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples
of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact
on “constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally),
the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.265

Notice, though, that this application of enhanced scrutiny
by Delaware courts still does not mean that the standard of review is equivalent to the standard of conduct.266 Rather than
asking if directors acted for the Exclusive Benefit of shareholders (the standard of conduct), Delaware courts ask if directors’
defensive measures were draconian or unreasonable (the standard of review).267 In other words, Unocal is basically a reasonableness (or negligence) standard—the court expressly held that
consideration of the effects of the takeover threat on nonshareholder constituencies was reasonable.268
Cases since Unocal have only confirmed this conclusion.269
For example, in Paramount Communications v. Time, the Time
See Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556.
See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 556.
264 Id.
265 See id. at 955.
266 See In re Trados Inc., 73 A.2d 17, 36 (Del. Ch. 2013).
267 Id.; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del.
1995) (describing Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny analysis as “first, upon whether
the [defensive measure] implemented was draconian, by being either preclusive
or coercive and; second, if it was not draconian, upon whether it was within a
range of reasonable responses to the threat [the tender offer] posed.” (first and
second emphasis added)).
268 See supra Part I.
269 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del.
1989).
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directors rejected a tender offer made by Paramount shortly after
Time had entered into agreements to merge with Warner.270 The
court held that the Time directors’ actions were reasonable because after an informed investigation they concluded in good faith
that Warner was the “best ‘fit’ for Time to achieve its strategic
objectives” and allowed for “the preservation of Time’s ‘culture,’ i.e.,
its perceived editorial integrity in journalism.”271 Further, the court
held that the Time board satisfied Unocal’s other prong because
Time’s response was not “coercive in nature” in the sense that it
“was not aimed at ‘cramming down’ on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form.”272
To be clear, the argument is not that decisions like Unocal
and Paramount give directors free reign to serve other constituencies to the detriment of shareholder value—dicta in those decisions (and in subsequent ones) expressly reject this position.273
The fact that Delaware courts apply enhanced scrutiny in the
hostile takeover context does not change anything about shareholders’ ability to enforce the exclusive benefit principle for every
other corporate decision outside of that context, no matter how
important it may be for shareholders or stakeholders alike.274
This is also true about the more recent decision of eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,275 a decision in the Unocal
line of cases that commentators often cite as evidence of the willingness of Delaware courts to enforce the interests of shareholders over those of all other groups.276 A closer look at the decision
Id.
Id. at 1152.
272 Id. at 1154–55. Further, the Paramount court held that Time’s response
was “proportionate” to the threat posed by Paramount’s offer because “the revised agreement and its accompanying safety devices did not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company or from
changing the conditions of its offer so as not to make the offer dependent upon
the nullification of the Time-Warner agreement.” Id. at 1155.
273 Id. at 1140; see also Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del.
1985).
274 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1363 (Del. 1995).
275 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
276 See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 181, 224 [hereinafter The Law of Corporate Purpose] (referring to
270
271
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reveals how little relevance it has, as a practical matter, for the
corporate social responsibility debate.277
In eBay, one of the three founders of the classified ads site
craigslist, Inc. had sold his interest in craigslist to eBay under certain conditions agreed to by the other two craigslist founders.278
But after eBay began another venture that competed with craigslist, the two remaining founders, Jim and Craig, made changes
to craigslist’s governance structure that sought to block eBay’s
ongoing influence on craigslist, including “the indefinite implementation of a poison pill,” or “Rights Plan.”279 In defending this
move at trial, Jim and Craig “advisedly described craigslist’s business using the language of ‘culture’ because that was what carried the day in Time.”280 But the Court of Chancery did not buy
it, finding that “there is nothing about craigslist’s corporate culture that Time or Unocal protects. The existence of a distinctive
craigslist ‘culture’ was not proven at trial. It is a fiction, invoked
almost talismanically for purposes of this trial in order to find
deference under Time’s dicta.”281
On its face, eBay demonstrates the limits of Delaware’s
authorization in Time for directors to consider nonshareholder
interests in the implementation of defensive measures.282 But a
closer look reveals just how extraordinary the eBay case was. The
court explained that no evidence had been introduced to show that
Jim and Craig had even considered whether the protection of craigslist “culture” via the Rights Plan would redound in some way to
increased shareholder value.283 Instead,
Jim and Craig simply disliked the possibility that the Grim
Reaper someday will catch up with them and that a company
like eBay might, in the future, purchase a controlling interest in
craigslist. They considered this possible future state unpalatable, not because of how it affects the value of the entity for its
stockholders, but rather because of their own personal preferences.


eBay as a case “where Delaware does enforce the shareholder primacy obligation.”).
277 See id.
278 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 6.
279 Id. at 32–33.
280 Id. at 33.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 30.
283 Id. at 34
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Jim and Craig therefore failed to prove at trial that they acted in
the good faith pursuit of a proper corporate purpose when they
deployed the Rights Plan. Based on all of the evidence, I find
instead that Jim and Craig resented eBay’s decision to compete with craigslist and adopted the Rights Plan as a punitive
response. They then cloaked this decision in the language of
culture and post mortem corporate benefit. Although Jim and
Craig (and the psychological culture they embrace) were the only
known beneficiaries of the Rights Plan, such a motive is no
substitute for their fiduciary duty to craigslist stockholders.284

In other words, the facts upon which the court based its
decision were particularly unusual and unfavorable for the director
defendants.285 At bottom, eBay is not a case about directors choosing
in good faith to benefit other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders.286 It is a case about directors attempting to restrict the
power of a particular shareholder over the corporate enterprise,
and subsequently trying to cover up that attempt with the pretext
of stakeholder benefit.287
The lesson here is an important one. A case like eBay shows
that Delaware courts have occasionally, in the hostile takeover context and on extraordinary facts, allowed shareholders to overturn
directors’ decisions that were justified by their benefits to stakeholders.288 But when read in conjunction with Unocal and Time,
eBay demonstrates how rare such decisions actually are.289 As
the Article explains, the extent to which eBay would apply to directors’ decisions that were made in good faith is highly doubtful,
and for decisions that do not involve defensive measures, it would
not apply at all.290
2. Changes of Control
The other type of corporate action that Delaware courts
review with enhanced scrutiny is the directors’ decision to sell a
See id.
See id.
286 See id. at 32.
287 See id.
288 See id at 46.
289 Compare id., and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958–
59 (Del. 1985), with Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1154–55 (Del. 1990).
290 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 35.
284
285
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controlling stake of the corporation.291 Less than a year after
Unocal, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued its seminal Revlon
opinion, which confined Unocal in important respects.292 Revlon
began much like Unocal, with the Revlon board attempting to
thwart an unwelcomed tender offer that had been made by a company called Pantry Pride.293 Pantry Pride made several offers to
acquire a majority of Revlon’s shares, each of which the Revlon
board determined were inadequate.294 In response, Revlon began
negotiations with an investment firm called Forstmann Little &
Co. in hopes of a friendly acquisition and a bidding war ensued.295
Eventually, the Revlon board rejected Pantry Pride’s offer and
agreed to an offer by Forstmann.296 Pantry Pride sought to enjoin
this transaction in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and raised its
offer so that it again beat Forstmann’s.297
Importantly for this discussion, the Revlon board justified
its selection of Forstmann’s offer over Pantry Pride’s offer on the
grounds that it afforded better treatment to the holders of outstanding Revlon notes, who were threatening litigation after the
notes had dropped in market value during the bidding war.298 And
even though bondholders are not typically featured prominently
in the corporate social responsibility debate, they are similar to
employees and customers in that their rights are fixed by contract and they are not owed fiduciary duties by directors.299
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis under the
Unocal framework, but then explained how the difference in circumstances required a difference in the directors’ duties:
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had

See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176
(Del. 1986).
293 Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175, with Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949–53.
294 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176–77.
295 See id. at 178.
296 See id.
297 See id. at 179.
298 See id. at 183–84.
299 See id. at 182.
291
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thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit. This significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole
question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’ role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.300

In short, once the board has decided to sell control of the company,
directors’ fulfillment of their fiduciary duties becomes unusually
simple: obtain the highest price for the shareholders.301
The Revlon court also clarified that while Unocal expressly
permitted directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies
like the noteholders, “there are fundamental limitations upon that
prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies
in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”302 Further, the court
explained that “such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress,
and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”303 Accordingly, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that:
the Revlon board could not make the requisite showing of good
faith by preferring the noteholders and ignoring its duty of loyalty
to the shareholders. The rights of the former already were fixed by
contract. The noteholders required no further protection, and
when the Revlon board entered into an auction-ending lock-up
agreement with Forstmann on the basis of impermissible considerations at the expense of the shareholders, the directors
breached their primary duty of loyalty.304

Thus, Revlon sets forth another set of circumstances under which shareholders are able to enforce the exclusive benefit
Id.
See id.
302 Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955) (emphasis added).
303 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
304 Id. (citations omitted).
300
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principle against Delaware directors.305 As scholars and courts
have noted, Revlon does not change directors’ standard of conduct but instead provides a specific application of it in the saleof-control context: Because directors must act for the exclusive
benefit of shareholders, it follows naturally that when the company is for sale, directors are obligated to seek the best deal for the
shareholders, without regard for other constituencies.306 But when
Delaware courts review such decisions, they do not ask simply
whether directors obtained the best price for shareholders, but
instead ask whether the board took reasonable steps to get the
best price reasonably available.307
3. The Limits of Enhanced Scrutiny
Enhanced scrutiny thus applies in two different but related
scenarios involving contested claims of ownership.308 As long as
a corporation has long-term prospects, as in Unocal (and eBay),
Delaware courts prohibit directors from implementing defensive
measures that are coercive or preclusive (i.e., “draconian”), while
nonetheless granting them a meaningful amount of discretion to
consider a tender offer’s potential impact on various constituencies, so long as the measures they implement are within the
range of reasonableness.309 But, once the directors have decided
that control of the company is up for sale, under Revlon, directors’ fiduciary duties are simplified into an obligation to obtain
the best price reasonably available for the shareholders, lest any

Id. at 184.
Id. at 181.
307 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994) (“Although an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board’s actions, a court should not ignore the
complexity of the directors’ task in a sale of control. There are many business
and financial considerations implicated in investigating and selecting the best
value reasonably available. The board of directors is the corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make these judgments. Accordingly, a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made
a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”).
308 See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 980–84.
309 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367, 1389 (Del. 1995).
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favoritism towards nonshareholders be used as pretext for improper self-interest.310
Undoubtedly, cases like eBay and Revlon stand as promising examples for shareholders looking to enforce the exclusive
benefit principle and root out stakeholder interested conduct, at
least when compared to cases that are decided under the business judgment rule.311 But it would be unwise to overstate their
importance to the corporate social responsibility debate.
First of all, it is directors who retain the ultimate decisionmaking authority as to whether a controlling stake in the company is for sale, as subsequent decisions have declined “to extend
Revlon’s application to corporate transactions simply because they
might be construed as putting a corporation either ‘in play’ or ‘up
for sale.’”312 This has led to the emergence of new terms of art, such
as “Revlon-land,”313 the (metaphorical) place in which corporate
directors find themselves after “Revlon duties” are “triggered”—
but the short of it is that directors have considerable discretion
over whether they will ever be governed by Revlon at all.314
In sum, shareholders looking to enforce a strict principle
of exclusive benefit against directors would likely have better luck
under enhanced scrutiny than under the business judgment rule,315
given that courts applying Unocal or Revlon will ask whether
directors took reasonable steps in the interests of shareholders,316
both of which leave little room for directors to get away with
serving the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.317 But, as
a practical matter, these cases are so limited in their application
that they do virtually nothing to empower shareholders to root
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
Compare eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del.
Ch. 2010), with Revlon, 506 A.2d 173, 184.
312 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1151 (holding that Revlon duties were not triggered by the board of directors’ decision to enter a merger agreement).
313 See, e.g., Geography of Revlon-Land, supra note 246, at 3280 n.7 (2013).
314 See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 987.
315 In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 82 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing Revlon,
506 A.2d at 180–82).
316 Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985), with Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179, 182.
317 See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 982–83.
310
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out the vast majority of stakeholder interested conduct, which receives the protection of the business judgment rule.318
C. The Duty of Loyalty and Entire Fairness
Unlike enhanced scrutiny, the entire fairness standard of
review is triggered not by a corporate action being of a specific
type, but by a corporate director having a material conflict of interest.319 As such, an entire fairness analysis can be triggered in
transactions that would generally be reviewed under the business judgment rule as well as in transactions that would already
be subject to enhanced scrutiny.320 In either case, however, the
triggering condition is the same: the inherently self-interested
nature of the transaction involved.321
Recall that the business judgment rule is Delaware’s default
standard of review.322 What must a shareholder plaintiff show to
rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule under an
allegation of director disloyalty? Delaware law offers only one conceptual path: establishing that the director is not “disinterested
and independent.”323 This means, for example,
that directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it
in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.324

This is a paradigmatic expression of what this Article calls
the principle of disinterestedness, and in Delaware corporate
jurisprudence this principle is enforced with full strength.325 If a
shareholder plaintiff establishes that a director had a “material

See id. at 1015.
See In re Trados Inc., 73 A.2d 17, 44 (Del. Ch. 2013).
320 See id. at 43–44.
321 See id. at 36.
322 See id. at 43.
323 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
324 Id. at 812 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); David J. Greene & Co.
v. Dunhill Int’l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)).
325 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 806.
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self-interest”326 in the transaction, the protections of the business judgment rule are lifted, and a Delaware court will review
the transaction under the exacting “entire fairness” standard.327
On the other hand, Delaware law does not consider directors’ stakeholder interested conduct to be a qualifying violation of
the duty of loyalty that would overcome the presumptions of the
business judgment rule and require entire fairness review.328 The
Delaware courts’ laser focus on director self-interest, while completely justified in context, means that director conduct that is not
self-interested is subjected to almost no judicial scrutiny at all.329 A
shareholder plaintiff who shows merely that a director intended
to benefit nonshareholder constituencies like employees or customers—without showing the director sought to benefit herself—
cannot avoid the application of the business judgment rule, which
entirely insulates the director’s decision from judicial review.330
Shareholders are thus entirely unable to enforce the broad principle
of Exclusive Benefit against directors in the operational context.331
Entire fairness can also be triggered in cases involving
ownership claim issues.332 However, much like the operational
context, only violations of the narrow definition of the duty of
loyalty, disinterestedness, trigger this heightened standard: “Where
actual self-interest is present and affects a majority of the directors approving a transaction, a court will apply even more exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is entirely fair
to the stockholders.”333 As discussed above, mere stakeholder
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995).
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement
of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides
of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”) (citing Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952)); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d
680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff’d, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene &
Co., 249 A.2d at 431.
328 See In re Opus East, LLC, 528 B.R. 30, 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
329 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
330 See id.
331 See id. at 36.
332 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
333 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9
(Del. 1994) (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710–11; Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993)).
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interested conduct in ownership claim cases is reviewed under
enhanced scrutiny.334
Because of this, when it comes to the debate on corporate
social responsibility, the entire fairness standard of review has
little relevance.335 Director conduct that is merely stakeholder
interested will never be subjected to entire fairness review given
that, by definition, it includes only conduct that is not tainted by
director self-interest.336 The result is that when directors make
disinterested decisions on how to distribute resources within the
firm, shareholders have no power to require them to prove to a
judge that their decisions were entirely fair.337
IV.THE USE AND MISUSE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
For decades, scholars of all stripes have made normative
arguments that corporate directors should owe fiduciary duties
not just to shareholders, but also to other constituencies.338 Some
focus exclusively on employees and customers, others exclusively
on creditors, and still others make more generalized proposals to
apportion the benefits of fiduciary duties to each corporate constituency (including shareholders) according to its contributions
to the firm.339 In each case, the point of these proposals is to protect corporate constituencies considered vulnerable to director
misconduct by creating a legal requirement that directors serve
their best interests as well, instead of serving only the interests
of shareholders.340
While it often goes without saying, each of these proposals
is based on this fundamental premise: Being owed corporate fiduciary duties meaningfully protects you against corporate conduct
that favors other constituencies at your expense.341 As explained
above, however, under current Delaware corporate law, directors’
See Interpreting Nonshareholder, supra note 197, at 980–82, 984; supra
Section III.B.
335 See supra Section III.B.
336 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995).
337 See id.
338 See supra Section I.B.
339 See id.
340 See id.
341 See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra
note 27, at 287.
334
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duty of loyalty requiring them to seek the exclusive benefit of
shareholders—the standard of conduct—is weakened significantly
in practice by the deferential standard of review by which Delaware courts evaluate such conduct, the business judgment rule.342
The result is that in almost every case, shareholders are virtually
powerless to prevent directors from engaging in conduct that benefits nonshareholder constituencies, or what this Article has called
stakeholder-interested conduct.343 And inversely, as explained
next, if Delaware law were amended so that corporate directors
owed fiduciary duties to nonshareholder groups, such groups would
likewise be virtually powerless to prevent director conduct that
they find similarly unfavorable—at least not without a corresponding change to the triggering conditions of Delaware’s standards
of review.344
A. Fiduciary Protection for Shareholders
Given the wide gap between the standard of conduct and
the standard of review, perhaps it is no surprise that scholars
disagree sharply on what corporate directors ought to do.345 Some
have argued at length that the freedom provided by the business
judgment rule amounts to a legal authorization for directors to
engage in stakeholder interested conduct whenever enhanced scrutiny or entire fairness do not apply.346 Others emphatically reject
that position, arguing that while Delaware law does not strictly

See supra Section III.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
344 See id.
345 Compare Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
supra note 27, at 1747, 1756–57, 1780, and Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 868–69 (2005), with Steven
Bainbridge, The Relationship Between the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm and the Business Judgment Rule, professorbainbridge.com (May 5, 2012)
[hereinafter The Relationship Between], http://www.professorbainbridge.com/pro
fessorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-relationship-between-the-shareholder-wealth
-maximization-norm-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html [https://perma.cc
/A7R3-8BPH].
346 The two most sophisticated defenses of this position are Blair & Stout,
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, supra
note 127, at 1736, and Elhauge, supra note 345, at 753.
342
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enforce the exclusive benefit norm in every case, this is merely
“an unintended consequence of the business judgment rule.”347
To scholars in this latter camp, the business judgment rule
doesn’t change the fact that Delaware “directors may [not] subordinate what they believe is best for stockholder welfare to other
interests, such as those of the company’s workers or society generally.”348 The point, as they see it, “is not whether the law permits
directors to engage in pretext, it is what the law allows them to
do expressly and forthrightly.”349 As such, these scholars have
focused on the symbolic power of decisions like Revlon and eBay,
which they admit apply only in discrete contexts,350 instead of on
the space created by this deferential standard of review:
The issue ... is not what directors might get away with in the
courtroom but what the law calls on directors to think and do
in the boardroom. Revlon and eBay tell us that directors’ decisions
must truly, actually, sincerely, be made in the best interests
of the shareholders.351

If directors can’t openly favor nonshareholder groups at the expense of shareholders, the argument goes, then it cannot be said
that they have the power to do so.352
But it is helpful to look at this from the other direction—
not what directors can do but what shareholders have the power
to prevent them from doing. Do fiduciary duties give shareholders the power to intervene every time corporate directors engage
in stakeholder interested conduct? Must they act secretly or dishonestly to be sure they can “get away” with it? Must they engage in
“pretext” each time they do so? Not at all.353 What the business
judgment rule provides directors is not simply an opportunity to
insert pretext or other trickery into their decisions, but rather
the freedom from having to justify their decisions to a Delaware
court at all.354
See The Relationship Between, supra note 345.
Dangers of Denial, supra note 48, at 764.
349 Id. at 782–83 n.84 (emphasis added); see also The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 276, at 1236.
350 See Dangers of Denial, supra note 48, at 782–83 n.84.
351 The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 276, at 225 (emphasis added).
352 See id.
353 See infra notes 355–59 and accompanying text.
354 See infra notes 355–59 and accompanying text.
347
348
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For example, when Google Inc., a Delaware corporation,
went public, its directors could and did acknowledge their “duty
as fiduciaries for [their] shareholders” while nonetheless committing
to fulfill their “responsibilities to [their] shareholders, employees,
customers and business partners.”355 While these latter responsibilities are not of a fiduciary nature, of course, they allow Google
to provide “many unusual benefits to [its] employees” and openly
declare its intentions “to add benefits over time rather than pare
them down.”356 It is not that these examples are violations of the
duty of loyalty, but precisely the opposite: Google shareholders
were powerless to stop them.357 No doubt the Google directors
received plenty of legal advice on what to say and what not to.358
But, in the end, did they need to be secretive about these actions,
or to play them down in any way? Did they open themselves up
to liability from shareholder suits trying to take them to task for
ignoring their interests? Did they ever get called in front of a judge
to present evidence that these benefits would ultimately redound to
shareholders? None of the above.359
Of course, corporate directors regularly do attempt to draw
the connection between benefits they provide to nonshareholders
and increased shareholder value.360 Sometimes they explain the
connection in detail, and other times they simply state in the most
general terms, as the Google directors did at their IPO, that they
were “careful to consider the long-term advantages to the company
of these benefits.”361 But do they ever have to convince anyone
that these long-term advantages are worth it for shareholders?
No, and here is why.362
Recall that, when directors are not self-interested or grossly
negligent, a court reviewing their decision will ask only whether
their decision was made with a good faith belief that it would
See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s
Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, GOOGLE, https://abc.xyz/investor/founders
-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html [https://perma.cc/W4P8-THML].
356 Id.
357 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 87.
358 See Page & Brin, supra note 355.
359 See The Relationship Between, supra note 345.
360 See Page & Brin, supra note 355 (explaining how benefits to nonshareholders will benefit shareholders).
361 Id.
362 See infra notes 363–74 and accompanying text.
355
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advance the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.363
Then, for example, consider specifically the “unusual” employee
benefits Google offers.364 The tech company is known for such
above-market employee perks like free gourmet meals and snacks,
free rides to work, professional massages at the office, and generous parental leave and life insurance benefits.365 Given that
these benefits are above and beyond what any employees could
claim is contractually owed to them, Google shareholders might
consider them an improper use of the corporation’s resources—after
all, directors’ fiduciary duties require them to use those resources
for the benefit of shareholders alone.366 But even though Google
directors did not defend themselves (and did not have to), a defense
of their actions is readily forthcoming: Such employee benefits
allow Google to attract and retain the highest quality employees,
to improve morale, and to increase productivity—benefits that ultimately redound to shareholders in the form of increased profits.367
Similar arguments can be made about any benefit offered
to other nonshareholder constituencies.368 Benefits to customers,
like discounts and warranties, can be expected to increase sales
(and thus profits), an obvious benefit to shareholders.369 Playing
nice with creditors will likely decrease the cost and increase the
availability of the corporation’s debt capital, adding further to the
corporation’s bottom line.370 Even benefits provided to less concrete constituencies—like the environment or various charitable or
social causes—contribute to a corporation’s brand in ways that can
be expected to improve that corporation’s standing in the marketplace, which again comes right back to the shareholders.371
In short, for virtually any conceivable action that corporate
directors take for the benefit of a nonshareholder constituency,
See supra Section III.A.
See Page & Brin, supra note 355.
365 Jillian D’Onfro & Lucy England, An Inside Look at Google’s Best Employee Perks, INC. (Sep. 21, 2015), https://www.inc.com/business-insider/best-google
-benefits.html [https://perma.cc/ZRX2-V5M5].
366 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424.
367 See Page & Brin, supra note 355.
368 See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
369 See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
370 See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
371 See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
363
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there is an abundance of explanations for how such action ultimately redounds to the benefit of shareholders and thereby fulfills directors’ fiduciary duties.372 Given that this Article’s thesis is
descriptive in nature, it does not attempt to defend this normative
argument here. For now, it is sufficient simply to demonstrate that
under current Delaware law, this deference virtually eliminates
shareholders’ ability to prevent directors’ apparent stakeholder
interested conduct by suing for breaches of fiduciary duty.373 Or,
looking at it from the perspective of directors, their fiduciary duties
to shareholders do virtually nothing to restrict their freedom to
act according to social or moral concerns even when these concerns are apparently entirely unrelated to their businesses.374
A few more examples will help illustrate this point. A
Delaware corporation like Delta Airlines can rescind travel discounts to members of the National Rifle Association in the wake
of a school shooting.375 Another Delaware corporation, Citigroup,
can respond to the same by setting restrictions on the sale of firearms by business partners.376 Yet another Delaware corporation,
Walmart, can close its stores for a day “to conduct anti-bias training” for all of its employees.377 In each example, shareholders could
See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
374 See, e.g., Samuel Hammond, Elizabeth Warren’s Corporate Catastrophe,
NAT. REV., Aug. 20, 2018, http://www.nationalreview.com/2018/08/elizabeth
warren-accountable-capitalism-act-terrible-idea/ [https://perma.cc/Y9N7-863V]
(stating that: “[i]n practice, corporate boards don’t have a fiduciary duty to do
much of anything in particular, outside of the standard prescriptions of common law. As an acquaintance who’s spent decades working in large, publicly
traded companies put it to me, “I often don’t know what does motivate corporate
decisions, but I can assure you it’s not that.”).
375 Ed Bastian, Delta and the School Safety Debate, DELTA (March 2, 2018),
https://news.delta.com/ed-bastian-memo-delta-and-school-safety-debate [https://
perma.cc/74SQ-5PK4] (“Our decision was not made for economic gain and our
values are not for sale.”).
376 Tiffany Hsu, Citigroup Sets Restrictions on Gun Sales by Business Partners, N.Y. TIMES (March 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/busi
ness/citigroup-gun-control-policy.html [https://perma.cc/MWZ8-FSMH].
377 Rachel Abrams, Starbucks Closes 8,000 U.S. Stores for Racial Bias Training After Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/04/17/business/starbucks-arrests-racial-bias.html [https://perma.cc/JB2M-VYC7];
see also Kevin Johnson, Starbucks CEO: Reprehensible Outcome in Philadelphia
Incident, STARBUCKS (April 14, 2018), https://news.starbucks.com/views/star
372
373
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object on the grounds that the action harms shareholders by devoting corporate resources to another group, such as the victims
of gun violence or improper bias, thereby reducing their profits.378
And the directors might respond to such objections by explaining
how the actions benefit shareholders, given that they can be expected to increase sales or goodwill or avoid future liability.379 It
is simply too easy for directors to—honestly and sincerely—believe
that their actions, even when apparently done for the benefit of
other constituencies, will benefit the interests of shareholders in
the long run.380
The point is not that one of these arguments is right and
the other is wrong but, to put it bluntly, that Delaware courts do
not care.381 So long as they are plausible, and they almost always
are, the business judgment rule applies.382 And the protections
of the rule are so powerful that the Delta CEO, for example, could
forego pretext entirely and instead proclaim that “[o]ur decision
was not made for economic gain and our values are not for sale”383—
of course, it is entirely possible that this statement was itself
made for economic gain, but the point is he will never have to
prove it.384 Instead, Delaware courts treat “the interests of the
shareholders as a class ... as congruent with those of the corporation in the long run,” which means they presume that shareholders’ interests are served by any corporate decision that could
rationally be expected to benefit the enterprise as a whole.385
This presumption expressly authorizes directors to act in ways
that negatively affect the short-term interests of any given constituency (shareholder or otherwise) in pursuit of other longterm objectives.386 In this way, nonshareholder constituencies

bucks-ceo-reprehensible-outcome-in-philadelphia-incident [https://perma.cc/U4
27-Q4HL].
378 See In Defense of the Shareholder, supra note 10, at 1424.
379 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
380 See id.
381 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
382 See id.
383 See Bastian, supra note 375.
384 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 252.
385 TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. 10298, 1989 WL 20290,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
386 Id. (noting that: “directors, in managing the business and affairs of the
corporation, may find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that
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regularly benefit from director decisions without any insincerity
or dishonesty involved, and shareholders have no power to haul
directors into Delaware courts to stop them.387
To be clear, this is not to suggest that under current Delaware law, nonshareholders have nothing to complain about because they are already getting plenty of benefits from directors.
What pro-stakeholder theorists want is not simply for nonshareholder groups to receive incidental benefits when they happen to
coincide with shareholder value, but instead the legal right to demand such benefits even when they do not.388 That is why this
Article’s argument begins with the premise of nonshareholders’
dissatisfaction, and proceeds to evaluate the potential that an extension of fiduciary duties might have to address and correct that
dissatisfaction.389 But, the next Section explains, fiduciary duties
will not provide the solution they are looking for.390
In sum, even though shareholders are owed fiduciary duties
by corporate directors, these duties do not empower shareholders
to protect themselves from corporate decisions they believe unfairly favor nonshareholder constituencies.391 Because the
heightened standards of review in Delaware are triggered only
by violations of disinterestedness and infrequent ownership control issues,392 directors who engage in stakeholder interested

are expected to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if
short run share value can be expected to be negatively affected, and thus directors
in pursuit of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the
claims of other “corporate constituencies” (citations omitted)). See also id. at
n.6 (noting that “[t]he list of such endeavors might touch upon every aspect of
running the business: research and product development; personnel training and
compensation; charitable and community financial support” (citations omitted)).
387 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this
Court will not question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder
interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying employees
higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular
corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder value. Under the Unocal standard, however, the directors must act within the range of reasonableness.”).
388 See Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2008) (explaining stakeholder governance).
389 See supra text accompanying note 7.
390 See infra Section IV.B.
391 See supra text accompanying note 157.
392 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (2011).
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conduct are almost always protected by the business judgment
rule—even though such conduct technically violates the duty of
loyalty.393 The result is that directors have nearly complete freedom to provide benefits to nonshareholder constituencies like employees, customers, creditors, the environment, etc.—and they
are free to do so openly, honestly, and sincerely.394
If fiduciary duties do so little to empower shareholders to
guard their interests over the interests of all other constituencies, though, is there any reason to believe that nonshareholder
constituencies could adequately protect themselves from similarly
unfavorable conduct simply by being owed fiduciary duties?
B. Fiduciary Protection for Nonshareholders
In recent decades, several scholars have argued that directors should owe fiduciary duties to nonshareholder constituencies, with the goal of empowering them to protect themselves
from corporate actions that favor other corporate constituencies
at their expense.395 Proposals have sought fiduciary protection for
groups as diverse as employees, customers, communities, creditors, and the environment; and, in most cases, the basic idea is
that under current law directors are too beholden to shareholders, and that this ought to change.396 For the sake of simplicity,
this discussion focuses on the argument to extend corporate fiduciary duties to employees, which recent proposals have argued
would protect them from unfavorable corporate conduct like
“opportunistic firings”397 or “exploitation.”398 However, the argument advanced in this Section applies to other nonshareholder
constituencies as well.

See id.; supra Section II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 207–08.
395 See supra text accompanying note 7; supra Section I.B.
396 See supra text accompanying notes 20–33.
397 See Bodie, supra note 2, at 867.
398 O’Connor, supra note 124, at 965; see also The Public Choice Problem,
supra note 17, at 1237 (“Under a stakeholderist corporate governance regime,
directors are restrained by the golden yoke of fiduciary obligation from engaging
in the kind of exploitation of nonshareholders that is impelled by the current
system” (emphasis added)).
393
394
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Some proposals for extensions of corporate fiduciary duties
to employees have argued for substantive protections (i.e., employees are protected against certain corporate actions or results),
while others have been limited to procedural protections (i.e.,
employees are owed special consideration, without any particular
prescribed outcome).399 Despite the differences between them, both
types of proposals imagine a scenario in which employees are entitled to sue directors (or the corporation) to protect themselves
from corporate decisions that do not go their way.400 As explained
above, however, even under current Delaware law—where directors
owe fiduciary duties exclusively to shareholders—shareholders
have almost no power to block corporate decisions they find unfavorable, due to Delaware’s deferential standards of review.401 As
such, this Part argues that changing the law by extending directors’
fiduciary duties to employees, without also changing the standard of review, will not empower employees to protect themselves
against corporate decisions they believe unfairly benefit other
constituencies at their expense.402
Of course, it is completely possible to argue that the standard
of review for claims of directors’ fiduciary violations should be
changed as well.403 But it is worth noting that proposals for fiduciary duties to employees do not actually make this argument, and
instead largely presume that there would be a congruence between
the standard of conduct governing directors and the standard of
review by which courts would evaluate them.404 Further, while it
is outside the scope of this Article’s descriptive argument, changing Delaware’s standard of review to align perfectly the standard
of conduct with the standard of review would not be a minor or
inconsequential change.405 Instead, it would disturb the fundamental principle in corporate law of directors’ authority to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation by allowing courts to
intervene on nearly every corporate decision regardless of its impact
See Lehr, supra note 31, at 131.
See id. at 117.
401 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (2011).
402 See supra notes 416–17 and accompanying text.
403 See Reis, 28 A.3d at 457.
404 See Lehr, supra note 31, at 133.
405 See supra Section III.A.
399
400
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or magnitude.406 And this conclusion—that there are convincing
reasons to hold constant Delaware’s standards of review—reinforces
the argument of this Article that extending directors’ fiduciary
duties to nonshareholders would not provide them with meaningful protection.407
On the assumption, then, that all other rules of corporate
law would remain unchanged, let’s evaluate the idea of corporate
directors owing fiduciary duties to employees. Begin with a paradigmatic example: a Delaware corporation debating whether to
outsource a significant portion of its production overseas, which
would result in the closure of its domestic production facility and
the layoff of thousands of American workers. This is exactly the
kind of corporate action that pro-stakeholder scholars care about:
instances where corporate directors move corporate resources away
from employees (in the form of lost wages and benefits) and their
local community (in the form of decreased investment and development) to shareholders (in the form of increased profits).408 And
it is because constituencies like employees are especially vulnerable
to such actions, the argument goes, that they should be owed fiduciary duties by directors so that they can protect themselves.409
Accordingly, some scholars have proposed fiduciary duties
to employees that include rather robust substantive protections,
such as the ability to sue directors (or the corporation) to prevent
corporate decisions that are “opportunistic” or “exploitative.”410
As the argument goes, employees have made firm-specific investments in the corporation—having spent time developing knowledge
of its products, processes, and people—that are not directly transferrable to other companies and thus will not produce the bargained-for payoff unless they are able to continue their work for
this same corporation.411 Laying them off before those firm-specific
See supra Section III.A; see also Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38,
at 85 (arguing in defense of the business judgment rule that “that corporate
decision-making efficiency can be ensured only by preventing the board’s
decisionmaking authority from being trumped by courts under the guise of
judicial review.”)
407 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
408 See Bodie, supra note 2, at 867.
409 See id.
410 See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text.
411 See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2017 (2013) (indicating the negative effects of short-term
shareholders on employees and other stakeholders).
406
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investments bear fruit thus constitutes a kind of exploitation or
unfair opportunism, as it allows the corporation to accept those
advantages without paying anything in exchange—all for the
benefit of shareholders.412 If directors owed employees fiduciary
duties, the argument goes, employees would be able to sue directors
for breaching such duties and therefore block such conduct.413
But how would this lawsuit play out? Assuming it did not
die at the demand stage and employees were actually able to plead
their case before a judge on the Delaware Court of Chancery, how
would that judge review their claims? Recall that Delaware’s most
exacting standard of review, entire fairness, applies only when a
director stands on both sides of a transaction and is thus especially prone to choosing her own self-interest above those of the
corporation and its employees414—but obviously such self-interest is
not present here, where the decision was made for the corporation
and its shareholders. And even Delaware’s intermediate standard of
review, enhanced scrutiny, is triggered only when directors implement defensive measures or decide to sell a controlling stake
in the corporation—again, neither of which are present here.415
What is left then, is the standard of review that is notoriously
deferential to directors, the business judgment rule: The decision
will not be overturned so long as it was the product of good faith
business judgment.416 This means that unless the employee
plaintiffs have some highly unusual, smoking gun–type evidence
that shows the directors asleep at the switch or motivated by
bad faith, the decision to outsource production will stand.417
So even in a world where directors owe fiduciary duties to
employees, with a standard of conduct requiring them to act in
employees’ best interests, employees would not be able to protect
See id.
See Lehr, supra note 31, at 106.
414 See supra Section III.C; Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d
442, 459 (2011).
415 Of course, one could imagine situations more relevant to employees that
present the “omnipresent specter” of director self-interest and therefore merit
judicial evaluation of the directors’ action with enhanced scrutiny—such as
directors setting the compensation arrangements at every level of the company,
including their own—but, once again, the decision of where the company should
source its production is surely not one of them. Reis, A.3d at 457.
416 See id.
417 See id.
412
413
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themselves from directors’ exploitative or opportunistic conduct because of the deferential standard of review.418 To be clear, recall
shareholders lack the power to compel directors to make any particular decisions, such as the described outsourcing, even when a very
strong case could be made that the decision would result in a definitive shareholder benefit.419 For both corporate constituencies,
the result would be the same: directors retain nearly unimpeded
authority over the business and affairs of the corporation.420
Perhaps recognizing the deference Delaware has long afforded to directors, other advocates of multi-stakeholder governance
have focused less on substantive norms and more on procedural
or process oriented norms they believe will benefit employees.421
For example, Professor David Yosifon has argued:
To make directors fiduciaries of workers and consumers, then,
would be to say that because contract is insufficient to protect
consumer interests and because the backstop of government
regulation is implausible under shareholder primacy, directors
must consider it their duty to “work hard and honestly” not only
to advance shareholder interests, but worker and consumer interests as well.422

In other words, although Delaware law is “unrepentantly
agnostic on substance,” as Yosifon puts it, employees would benefit from the imposition of “procedural obligations on fiduciaries”
that require anything “from reading reports, to hearing presentations, to engaging in discussion and debate. To require directors
to attend as fiduciaries to the interests of workers and consumers
at the level of firm governance would thus also provide workers
and consumers with the benefits of the process obligation.”423
Although procedural obligations in the interests of employees and customers are not meaningless, the fiduciary duty of
care in Delaware already imposes a standard of conduct on directors that largely comports with what Yosifon is suggesting.424
See id.
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
420 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
421 See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236; Lehr, supra note
31, at 133–34.
422 Id. (quoting EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 107, at 91).
423 The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236.
424 See id.
418
419
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As explained above, courts uphold the presumption of the business judgment rule only if a director has acted on an informed
basis, which can be satisfied, as Professor Yosifon notes, by relying on reports of management and other advisors.425 And even if
these reports are primarily oriented toward securing shareholder
profits (as Professor Yosifon supposes), they undoubtedly also convey which operational decisions directors should make to pursue
such profits, and as such, the shareholders will present the relevant tradeoffs to the directors for consideration.426
Outsourcing is again a perfect example. The “informed basis”
requirement under current Delaware law would require the director to know, at the very least, the total loss of personnel, if for
no other reason than to calculate the savings in expenses and
production costs.427 But, what is more, most directors (and managers) already see themselves as having significant responsibilities to stakeholders like employees and customers, even if these
are not fiduciary in nature.428 Further, even the most cold-hearted
capitalist would likely consider the reputational effects such action
would have on the company and would thereby run through the
“process obligations,” if only to calculate potential blowback.429
Thus, while directors may nonetheless proceed with outsourcing
in the interests of shareholders, they would have no trouble satisfying their “process obligations” to employees before doing so,
even under current law.430
But even on the premise that director fiduciary duties to
employees would significantly increase the amount of process employees receive from directors,431 how much protection would they
See id.
See id.; see Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
427 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
428 See Director Primacy, supra note 56, at 576 (“The 2000 edition of Korn/Ferry
International’s director survey found that when making corporate decisions,
directors most frequently ranked shareholder interests as their primary concern,
although it also found that a substantial number of directors feel a responsibility towards stakeholders.”).
429 See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236; Eisenberg, supra
note 189, at 438, 442–44; KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE
LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 162 (2006).
430 See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236; Eisenberg, supra
note 189, at 438, 442–44; GREENFIELD, supra note 429, at 162.
431 See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236.
425
426
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ultimately add? For the sake of argument, let’s just assume employees get these obligations for free (meaning they give nothing
up in return for the benefits). As Yosifon puts it, if the issue ex ante
is that executives and shareholders really do hold all the economic
power relative to other constituencies like employees,432 would
new process obligations to employees actually result in a meaningful number of companies foregoing the described outsourcing?
More importantly, if a company like GM were to go ahead with the
outsourcing anyway, what could employees do about it?
Even if Yosifon’s proposed standard of conduct—“work hard
and honestly” to serve the interests of workers—was conterminous
with the standard of review, the substance of the decision is by
definition completely out of bounds from judicial review.433 That
means directors could layoff large portions of their workforce so
long as their decision was the product of hard and honest work—
maybe the reports and presentations seen by the directors projected that continuing domestic production would result in an even
bigger layoff in five years—and courts would find that their fiduciary obligations to employees had been satisfied.434 In short, even if
the employees gained the legal right to compel directors to work
hard and honestly for them, it is highly unlikely this right would
protect employees from the kind of “exploitative” or “opportunistic” conduct they are worried about.435
To be clear, the point is not that increased process obligations would result in no improvements for employees whatsoever.
It may contribute to further cooperation between management
and workers by establishing cultures of “fairness” and “legitimacy”
surrounding the firm’s decision-making processes.436 It may even
result in more efficient relational contracts between them, to the
See id. at 1236–37.
See id.
434 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44; see, e.g., supra notes 355–57,
365–68 and accompanying text.
435 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44; see, e.g., supra notes 355–57,
365–68 and accompanying text.
436 GREENFIELD, supra note 429, at 160–63. Indeed, Greenfield argues that
what “really matters” is “procedural justice,” such that the outcomes of such
procedures—or “distributive justice”—are important mostly as a means to judge
the procedures. Id. This Article agrees procedural fairness is important, but
questions its superseding value when divorced from distributive concerns.
432
433
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benefit of all corporate constituents.437 But it is unwise to exaggerate these advantages.438 If the whole point of expanding the
class of constituents to whom directors owe of a duty of loyalty is to
address the disparity of bargaining power between management
and employees, it will not be much help to employees if the only
added tool in their toolkit is the right to force the directors through
yet another loosely defined process.439 If the power disparity really
is what Yosifon says it is, an added process obligation will barely
slow directors (or shareholders) down.440
Unsurprisingly, this result would be even further compounded by Delaware’s deferential standards of review.441 If the
directors made the decision to outsource in the absence of selfinterest, Delaware courts would not intervene so long as the
decision was otherwise the product of informed business judgement—just as they would not under current law.442 The same is
true for any other decision by directors not involving their own
self-interest.443 Thus, in virtually every imaginable corporate
scenario, a newly imposed standard of conduct requiring directors
Id. at 166–70. Professor Greenfield bases his argument on “a growing
body of scholarship ... that argues persuasively that relational, incomplete contracts are actually more efficient and socially optimal than contracts that are
completely bargained and are full of terms and conditions.” Id. at 167. However, he also acknowledges workers’ contracts tend to be in the former category.
Id. at 168. Thus, his account seems incomplete: more is needed to establish that
the current level of trust between employer and employee—on which their incomplete contracts are currently supported—is not already the optimal level
of trust for such relationships.
438 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 24, at 38.
439 See id.
440 See id. It appears that this is what Professor Jonathan Macey means when
he says, “[t]his is what it means to have unequal bargaining power. Employers
unable (due to minimum wage laws or other constraints) to reduce workers’
wages or benefits simply will hire fewer workers. Thus, it is not possible to
sustain the argument that imposing fiduciary duties will help workers who lack
bargaining power; any lack of bargaining power on the part of the workers
simply will manifest itself in some other way, such as in the form of a reduction
in wages.” Id.; see also The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236.
441 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
442 See supra Section IV.A; see also In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative
Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996); Eisenberg, supra note 189,
at 438, 442–44.
443 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
437
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to “work hard and honestly” for employees would provide nothing
more than a negligible amount of additional protection for employees when there has not also been a change to the triggering
conditions of Delaware’s standards of review.444
In sum, directors’ fiduciary duties to employees, whether
substantive or procedural in content, would have almost no meaningful impact on how employees are treated vis-à-vis the other
constituencies of the corporation.445 Just as shareholders are powerless under current law to prevent corporate actions they believe
unfairly favor employees at their expense, likewise would employees
be powerless to prevent corporate actions in scenarios that they
believe are reversed.446 The same is true for creditors, customers,
communities, the environment, et cetera—unless Delaware were
to make major changes to its standard of review jurisprudence,447
the extension of director fiduciary duties to these nonshareholder
constituencies would do very little to address whatever vulnerability
they may have to the corporation’s pursuit of shareholder profit.448
Finally, none of this is to say Delaware’s standards of review make fiduciary duties entirely useless or obsolete.449 Recall
both enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness serve important purposes depending on the context.450 No doubt if directors owed
fiduciary duties to employees, customers, creditors, or the like, they
would be empowered to hold directors accountable the same ways
shareholders do under current law.451 What matters for the corporate social responsibility debate, however, is not whether directors can get away with serving themselves but whether they can
get away with serving other constituencies in the normal course
of business.452 And for that purpose, the use of fiduciary duties
has a very limited potential.453
See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236; Eisenberg, supra
note 189, at 440–41.
445 See Macey, supra note 24, at 38; Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
446 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
447 See id.; supra notes 356–58 and accompanying text.
448 See supra notes 386–87, 434–35 and accompanying text.
449 See id.
450 See supra notes 249–50, 253, 255, 258, 262, 319, 321, and accompanying text.
451 See The Public Choice Problem, supra note 17, at 1236–37.
452 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 438, 442–44.
453 See id.
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C. Other Mechanisms for Nonshareholder Protection
One final point of clarification. This Article does not contend
that nonshareholders like employees and customers have no reason to be dissatisfied with their portion under current corporate
law simply because Delaware’s standard of review is sufficiently
deferential to allow directors to offer benefits to nonshareholders
from time to time.454 The point is merely that the deferential standard of review makes fiduciary duties the wrong tool to address
whatever dissatisfaction nonshareholders do have.455 And because Delaware’s foundational principle of director authority
over the business and affairs of the corporation is compelling as a
matter of normative policy,456 any attempt to modify the standard of review in addition to modifying the list of beneficiaries to
whom directors owe fiduciary duties bears the burden of proving
it would be neither unwise nor impractical.457
As such, scholars and practitioners who seek to protect the
interests of a given corporate constituency—whether shareholders,
employees, or otherwise—should look to other legal mechanisms
to secure such protection.458 Shareholders (and scholars who advocate on their behalf) would likely have better luck by implementing or improving incentive-based director compensation,459
or strengthening the influence of independent directors.460 Inversely, employees and their advocates would do well to focus
their efforts on increasing the employees’ role in corporate governance, and perhaps even seek to participate in the gains of the
corporate enterprise.461

See supra notes 250, 401, 416, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 386–87, 401–02, 407 and accompanying text.
456 See Business Judgment Rule, supra note 38, at 86–87.
457 See supra notes 403–07 and accompanying text.
458 See infra notes 459–61 and accompanying text.
459 See, e.g., S. Burcu Avci et al., Ending Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 326 (2016).
460 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883–92
(1991).
461 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued corporate fiduciary duties serve the
very narrow purpose of preventing directors from improvidently
benefiting from their role at the expense of shareholders or from
committing gross lapses of care or good faith.462 What this means
is that the law can effectively use fiduciary duties to prevent a director’s self-interested, negligent, or bad faith conduct—but, beyond
that, the business judgment rule protects directors from shareholder liability, even when their decisions appear to favor other
stakeholders.463 The result is that fiduciary duties are a poor tool
for regulating corporate directors’ stakeholder interested conduct,
such as those in which they distribute resources among the other
nonbeneficiary corporate constituencies.464 As such, nonshareholder
constituencies like employees, customers, and communities have
little to gain from becoming beneficiaries of the directors’ fiduciary duties.465 Those who wish to protect other constituencies from
corporate externalities would do well to focus on different legal
devices to secure such protection.466
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